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SOCIAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL CHOICE:
DAMAGES AND FEDERAL STATUTES
JANET S. LINDGREN*
T he dominant mode of making choices in law, whether by legis.
lators or judges, is a utilitarian calculation of the public good.1
The persons for whom legal decisions are made are recognized in
that calculation only to the extent that their interests coincide with
those of the "public." 2 The prevalence of this mode of choice is
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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and Social Policy of the State University of New York at Buffalo. I owe special thanks to
Willard Hurst for his teaching and criticism and to Robert W. Gordon for his suggestions
and encouragement. Al Katz, John Henry Schlegel and Thomas Schofield gave further aid
and comfort.
1. The ideas that are part of utilitarian thought duster and sometimes overlap, but
they do not merge into any singular doctrine. Weber and Diesing explain utilitarian as-
sumptions in describing a "rational bureaucratic society." M. WEBER, ON LAw IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 349 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); P. DIESING, REASON IN SocsErY 61 (1962).
Richard Posner explains how economics rests on "the assumption that man is a rational
maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions." He elaborates on the concept of efficiency:
"a technical term; it means exploiting economic resources in such a way that human satis-
faction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services is
maximized. Value too is defined by willingness to pay." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 4 (1972). Kenneth Arrow describes "social welfare functions," restating Bergson's for-
mulation of the problem of making welfare judgments:
[T]he process [is) assigning a numerical social utility to each social state, the aim
of society then being described by saying that it seeks to maximize the social utility
or social welfare subject to whatever technological or resource constraints are Tele-
vant or, put otherwise, that it chooses the social state yielding the highest possible
social welfare within the environment.
K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22 (1963). C. BAY, THE STRUCTURE OF
FREEOM 58 (1958) provides a concrete description of the consequences of a certain cut of
utilitarian theory-Benthamites "tended to take it for granted that the greatest possible
sum of happiness was to be achieved in an unequal society with a large and prosperous
middle class." The primary factor I see in such thought, apparent in the contrast I draw
between direct and vicarious treatment, is the willingness to exclude some individuals as
a means of achieving the preferred society. For more general descriptions and discussion
of utilitarian premises, see Grey's review of J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUsTICE (1971), in
The First Virtue, 25 STAN. L. REv. 286 (1963), where he attempts to set the intellectual
background against which Rawls writes. See also J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Fontana ed.
1962); A. QUINTON, UTILITARIAN ETIcs (1973); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L.
& EcoN. 1 (1960).
2. I use the term "public" with the understanding that it means only some portion
of the population that has the power to impose its views. R. WIEBE, SEGMENTED SOCIE Y
168 (1975) expresses the variable nature of the term. "Public expresses an inclination
rather than a formal state of affairs; it appears in degrees. As a leaning, it is measurable
along a continuum-a range of publicness-that registers certain qualities of public be-
havior without insisting upon the simultaneous presence of all components."
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constantly reinforced. First, with its continuing dominance, the
understanding has often been lost that utilitarian assumptions are
a choice, not a given-choices in law can be made on other bases.
Without the awareness that a basic choice has been made, there is
neither the desire nor the opportunity to develop or evaluate
alternatives to that choice. Second, language reflects the uses to
which it is put-both in the words and concepts that are available,
and in the meanings that are attributed to them.8 The terms cur-
rently used in law have grown out of utilitarian expression and
readily express utilitarian assumptions. Criticism is thereby limited
because new terms are suspect, and unfamiliar words are less
meaningful. Third, in developing alternative bases for choice in
law, one must write incrementally and outside of familiar ground,
for the growth and completion of these ideas comes with the re-
action of others and with their testing in varying substantive areas.
The development of alternatives is frustrated to the extent that
response is reserved for Writing within current assumptions or for
fully developed alternatives.
Always present, and taken almost as a constant, the utilitarian
assumptions that underlie legal choices tend to drop out of our
consciousness and disappear from discussion. This article first un-
earths and describes these assumptions in one representative area of
law. The next step, from description of current practice to devel-
oping alternatives, requires breaking a confining circle-concepts,
language and questions that are free of the assumptions of the
current model are needed, but that model has formed the language
and concepts that are available and has determined which ques-
tions are important and which are trivial.4 The second portion of
the article attempts to take an initial step in breaking that circle.
3. See S. MARCUS, ENGLES, MANCHES!ER AND THE WOaRING CLAss (1974); G. STEINER,
LANGUAGE AND SILENCE (1967). Steiner deals with the phenomenon most directly in talking
about the effect of the Nazi experience on the German language. Marcus describes a close
relation between language and conclusion: "they are two parts of a single process." S.
MARCUS, supra at 141.
4. See Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States, 23
BUFFALO L. REv. 343 (1974). Professor Homburger discussed the Eisen class action damage
claim for $65,000,000 for overcharges of $70 per plaintiff by odd-lot brokers. "Thus en-
larged in dimension, the lawsuit became a matter of public concern. The public is vitally
interested in a serious charge which involves massive violations of the antitrust laws and
affects millions of small investors in the United States and abroad," Id. at 345. The mat-
ter is "public" when it is large, and important when it is public. So we now find ourselves
transforming persons into public entities, into "private attorneys general," before they can
raise issues for the public, and relegating personal consequence to casual unconcern.
[Vol. 28
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A basis for choice in law is described as the opposite of that cur-
rently prevailing-both public good and individual needs are
defined in terms of the persons involved. ' It is for the courts, I
argue, to implement that alternative, and it is crucial that they do
so-crucial because implementation maintains the extremes within
which other alternatives can develop, and because the values em-
bodied in the alternative are important in themselves.
I. THE BAsIS FOR CHOICE IN LAW
Legislators make choices in the creation of law. That fact is
recognized without hesitation because the legislature is considered
a political body.6 In making their choices, legislators have largely
sought to "maximize the social utility or social welfare subject to
whatever technological or resource constraints are relevant."'7 The
desire to effect equality among individuals has seldom constituted
such a constraint, and this willingness to exclude some individuals
as a means of achieving the preferred society is characteristic of
utilitarian efficiency.
Judges and legal commentators tend to suppress the political
in their work, to assume that the basis for choice is settled. The
assumption that the legal commentator is a neutral observer has
prevailed almost as tenaciously as did the earlier natural law view
that judges received or discovered the common law. Judges, es-
pecially when making decisions in a statutory context, still some-
times revert to the language of discovery and avoid the appearance
of creation.8 Even when the existence of choice is recognized by
5. G. WooD, Tim CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969) described the basis
for this view. "[W]e may insist that in our polity all be entitled to a measure of recogni-
tion simply because they are human." The task then is to determine the content of that
"recognition." For example, C. BAY, supra note 1, at 11, makes the case for preferring those
choices that facilitate each individual's "health and growth toward the full attainment of
his individuality." Bay makes free expression the primary value and builds equality in by
definition: "expression is not maximally free if some people are deprived of it or have
less of it than others." Id. at 59.
6. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HRv. L.
Rxv. 1 (1959).
7. K. ARRow, supra note 1, at 28.
8. Judges consistently act as though the legislature creates things--rights, interests,
duties, obligations-which the courts simply receive. G6ny early taught that what the
legislature usually produces is generalities and principles from which the courts then build:
As for other logical consequences to be deduced from these principles, the legis-
lator has not suspected them . . . . In consecrating them, no one can claim
either to be following his will or to be bowing to his judgment. All that one does
1979]
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commentators or judges, the basis for making the choice-the social
theory that informs choice-is still treated as a given, and it is the
utilitarian assumptions, reinforced as I have described, that are
regularly taken as the given. Judicial decisions, in opinion and
outcome, thus tend to repeat the legislative effort to maximize the
public good.
A. Damages Based on Federal Statute-A Useful Example
A person injured sometimes bases his or her claim for damages
on a federal statute that neither provides for nor precludes such re-
covery.9 I have assumed that the parties injured in the instances
that follow could have established the facts alleged. Each entry de-
scribes an injury, the statute on which a federal claim would have to
be based, and the enforcement scheme provided by the statute. The
thereby is to develop a principle, henceforth isolated and independent of the will
which created it, to transform it into a new entity, which in turn develops of
itself, and to give it an independent life, regardless of the will of the legislator,
and, most often in despite of it.
G~ny, Mdthode d'Interprdtation et Sources en Droit Privd Positif at xvi (1919), quoted in
B. CwDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144-45 (circa 1949). Thus from the
requirement that "each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or
operates pipeline facilities shall comply with the requirements of such [Natural Gas Pipe.
line Safety] standards," 49 U.S.C. § 1677 (a) (1) (1976), or from the prohibition against
discharge for "garnishment for any one indebtedness," it is the courts that create "rights"
to employment, "obligations" to comply with procedure, "interests" in continued natural
gas service, and "duties" to current employees.
9. Federal courts have exercised the power to determine whether damages will be
available to persons basing their claim on violation of a federal statute that neither in-
dudes nor precludes damages. That exercise of power is usually based on "arising under"
jurisdiction provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1976). Such jurisdiction would seem to
have been dear since the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), concluded
that federal courts had jurisdiction under § 1331 to determine whether they "can grant
money recovery for damages said to have been suffered as a result of federal officers vio-
lating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Id. at 684. See Katz, The Jurisprudence of
Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1968). In most instances the courts, consistent with Bell v. Hood, go directly to
determining whether the complaint states a claim for purposes of a FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6)
motion to dismiss. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes Not
Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1090 (1948). It is not my purpose to reinforce
the case for the existence of that poiver nor to work out the possible remaining difficulties
with its formulation. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 438 U.S. 914 (1979); Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Professor Hart, in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYvrEas 332-35 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER], pushes the other side of the question:
whether Congress can deny remedy by denying jurisdiction to any federal court to provide
the remedy, and by prohibiting state court provision of remedy. The context of this
article does not force us to that difficult question for these are all instances where federal
question jurisdiction should be available and where Congress has not explicitly limited
jurisdiction.
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statutes cover occasionally overlapping problems of safety and
health, labor, and economic planning. The statutory strategies vary
from shared funding and statutory prohibition with penalties to
administrative regulation with penalties. The claimants range
from indigents in need of medical care to industrial users of regu-
lated natural gas. These instances will provide the examples for
subsequent argument.
Richard Doak was injured in a natural gas explosion at the
Claxton Poultry Company where he was employed. 10 Doak lost the
use of one arm, ten years of expected life, and the use of his one
good eye, leaving him legally blind. The natural gas distribution
system was owned and operated by the city of Claxton, Georgia.
The gas was distributed under pressure which exceeded safety
standards established by the Department of Transportation under
the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968" and adopted by the
Georgia Public Service Commission. 2 Violators of these regula-
tions are subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each day
that the violation continues, to a maximum of $200,000 for any
related series of violations. 3 The Secretary of Transportation is
given the power to require persons operating natural gas facilities
to remove hazards to life or property.' 4
The trustees of the Wright Memorial Hospital obtained build-
ing grants of $290,000 under the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and
Construction Act.' 5 The receipt of such funds is conditioned on
the hospital providing "a reasonable volume of services to persons
unable to pay therefore," though an exception to that requirement
may be made if the provision of such services is "not feasible from
a financial viewpoint."' 16 Floyd Stanturf, an indigent, was denied
10. Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ga. 1975). The details were re-
ported by his lawyers, Messrs. Merrill and Reeves, Clark & Merrill, Swainsboro, Ga.
11. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1684 (1976).
12. Id. The Act does not apply to pipeline facilities within a state that, among other
things, annually certifies that it "has adopted each Federal Safety Standard applicable to
such pipeline facilities and transportation of gas established under this chapter as of the
date of the certification." Id. § 1674 (a) (2).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 1678 (a) (1976). The penalty may be compromised by the Secretary,
who may consider the size of the business, the gravity of the violation, and good faith in
attempting compliance. 49 U.S.C. § 1678 (b) (1976).
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1672 (b) (1976).
15. Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883, 885 (W.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2) (1976). 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (d) (1) (1979) sets the presump-
tive compliance guideline for uncompensated services for each year at "not less than the
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
services by employees of Wright Memorial and suffered injuries
because of delayed treatment.17 The Surgeon General may with-
hold further federal payments if a hospital fails to meet the condi-
tions of funding. If funding on the project that violated the statute
has been completed, funds on related projects will be withheld
"until the State repays or arranges for the repayment of Federal
moneys to which the recipient was not entitled." 8
The Washington Post employed Diana Powell as a part-time
clerk. 9 Powell notified officers of the Post on several occasions that
some of the clerks they employed were working in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.20 She was discharged by the Post when
it learned of her intention to submit the matter to the Department
of Labor. The Secretary of Labor investigated the operations of
the Post and was unable to find any evidence of a violation of the
statute. The Act prohibits discharge of, or discrimination against,
any employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under . . .
this chapter, or has testified, or is about to testify in any such
proceeding. ' 2 1 The penalty for retaliation is a maximum fine of
$10,000, or imprisonment for not more than six months for a sec-
ond offense. 2 Actions to restrain violations can only be brought
by the Secretary of Labor.
2 3
Roger Breitwieser died at age sixteen when the forklift truck
lesser of 3 percent of operating costs or 10 percent of all Federal assistance provided to
.. . the applicant under the Act."
17. It is not possible to draw a clear story from the trial judge's opinion. Stanturf
claimed $250,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for the hospital's
refusal to accept him as a charity or paying patient. He alleged that he had suffered severe
exposure when his automobile was stuck in a snowdrift and that he was denied care at
Wright Memorial the next day. Several days later he was admitted to another hospital
and it was necessary to amputate both of his legs. Ironically, the trust agreement under
which Wright Memorial Hospital was created provided that "[t]he purpose of this trust
is to give free hospital, surgical and medical care to as many poor sick of the City of
Trenton, Missouri, or of Grundy County, Missouri, as possible." Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F.
Supp. 883, 886 (W.D. Mo. 1963), af'd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
977 (1965).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (g) (1976).
19. Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
21. Id. § 215 (a) (3). Because the court was unwilling to entertain a private action,
it did not have occasion to decide whether a violation of § 215 (a) (3) exists when the em-
ployee has not complained to the Secretary of Labor and no investigation has commenced.
22. Id. § 216 (a). That section applies only to willful violation. "Retaliation" would
seem to assume that state of mind.
23. Id. § 211 (a).
[Vol. 28
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he was driving for KMS Industries turned over.24 The Secretary of
Labor had declared in an order that the operation of a high fork-
lift truck was an occupation "particularly hazardous" for employees
under the age of eighteen.25 Employers who permit children to
use such trucks violate the Fair Labor Standards Act. 6 Willful
violation of the child labor provisions subjects a defendant to a
penalty of $10,000, and upon second conviction, to imprisonment
for as much as six months.
27
Abelardo Flores and other slaughterhouse workers went on
strike against the George Braun Slaughterhouse, largely on the
issue of wages. Their employer hired Mexican nationals knowing
they had entered the United States illegally. The strike was broken,
and Amalgamated Meatcutters lost its union majority at George
Braun when most of the striking workers either did not return or
were not rehired.28 The Immigration and Nationality Act 29 ex-
cludes aliens "seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose
of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of
Labor has determined . . . that . . . there are not sufficient
workers in the United States . . . , [and] the employment of
such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working condi-
tions of the workers in the United States similarly employed."80
Conviction for willfully or knowingly concealing, harboring or
shielding from detection an illegal alien subjects the offender to
a fine not exceeding $2,000 and to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five yearsY1 The mere fact of employment is not "deemed
to constitute harboring. "82
John Stewart was discharged by the Traveler's Insurance
Company when his wages were garnished for one debt 3 Such a
24. Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
969 (1973).
25. Id. at 1392.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (c) (1976).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (a) (1976).
28. Flores v. George Braun Packing Co., 482 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1973). The cryptic
per curiam opinion tells little of the story: plaintiffs based their claim on "employment
of Mexican nationals who illegally entered the United States." Id. at 280. The details
were provided by Frank Herrera, San Antonio, Texas, attorney for plaintiffs.
29. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
30. Id. § 1182 (a) (14).
31. Id. § 1324 (a).
32. Id.
33. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
1979]
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dismissal is prohibited by the Consumer Credit Protection Act.84
The Secretary of Labor failed to seek reinstatement or damages
for Stewart pursuant to his authority to enforce the provisions of
the statute.3 ' The penalty that Congress provided for a willful
violation of the restriction on discharge from employment for
garnishments was a fine of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment
for not more than one year. 6
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company provided process and
boiler gas to Farmland Industries for the manufacture of anhydrous
ammonia for use as fertilizer. The facilities used by Kansas-Ne-
braska were constructed under a certificate of convenience and
necessity issued by the Federal Power Commission, and were the
only source of natural gas in the region. In January 1971, during
a contract dispute, Kansas-Nebraska abandoned boiler gas service
for two weeks without obtaining permission as required by the
Natural Gas Act.37 The increased cost to Farmland of using fuel
oil for the two week period was $33,824.38 The Commission can
seek injunctions in district court whenever it appears that any
person is engaged in, or about to engage in, any acts that violate
the statute.3 9 A maximum fine of $5,000, or imprisonment for not
more than two years, is the penalty for a knowing and willful viola-
tion, with an additional fine of $500 for each day the offense
occurs.
40
Maintenance, Inc. was the low bidder for a contract to furnish
commercial janitorial services for the McDill Air Force Base at
Tampa, Florida. The contract was a "small-business set-aside con-
tract" for which only a small-business concern is eligible to bid.41
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (a) (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1676 (1976) provides that "The Secretary of Labor, acting through
the Wages and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, shall enforce the provisions
of this subchapter."
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (b) (1976).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 717 (1976). Farmland Indus. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co.,
486 F.2d 315, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1973).
38. This was the sum awarded as damages by the district court for unlawful termi-
nation of service of boiler gas.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 717s (a) (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (T) (1976).
41. Royal Serv. Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966). The Aid to
Small Businesses Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976), defines a small business as "one which
is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation,"
id. § 632, and authorizes the administrator of the Small Business Administration to de-
velop size criteria. Those criteria, enacted pursuant to § 634 (b) (6) of the Act, appear at
13 C.F.R. § 121.3 (1979). The Administration and the contract procurement or disposal
[Vol. 28
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Maintenance and Royal Services each certified in writing to the
procurement division of the Air Force, as required, that it was a
small business concern within the rules and regulations of the
Small Business Act.4 2 Maintenance did not qualify as a small
business, and its misstatement violated the Act. Royal Services,
the next lowest bidder, did qualify. Royal lost profits because it
did not obtain the contract. The statute provides a penalty of
$5,000 or two years imprisonment for knowingly making a false
statement for the purpose of obtaining benefits under the Small
Business Act.
43
I find no cases that force judges to examine, much less to
articulate, their fundamental assumptions. The fact of choice in
assumptions can always be denied or ignored. The cases I have just
described are nonetheless particularly useful ones for examining
judicial assumptions about the relation of public and individual
good, for the easiest avoidance techniques are unavailable in them
and the issue is relatively clear and isolated.4
The court cannot postpone consideration of the needs of in-
dividual parties in the cases that I have described. Damages are
the last opportunity for a federal judge to decide how injury to
individual good is to be related to the public good defined by the
legislature. 5 It is the last point at which a judge can decide how
agency determine when contracts shall be set aside for small businesses pursuant to the
criteria at 15 US.C. § 644 (1976), including "(3) . . . the interest of assuring that a fair
proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the Govern-
ment are placed with small-business concerns ... .
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976).
43. Id. § 645 (a). Maintenance, Inc. and Royal Services were each required to certify
in writing to the procurement division of the Air Force that they were a small business
concern within the rules and regulations of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647
(1976).
44. The disadvantage of using these cases is that the question of the proper relation
of the federal courts to Congress and to the states is so consistently analyzed and debated
(see, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 438 U.S. 914 (1979); and HART & WEcHsLER,
supra note 9-taught in law schools throughout the country), that these issues easily
overshadow all others. It is clear from the contrast between judicial decisions before
and after 1972, that these concerns need not preclude judicial activity in these cases. In-
stead, I suggest that current deference to the states and to Congress illustrates the strength
of commitment to resolving cases on their "public issues."
45. When damages are claimed in state court, statutes are most often relied on to
help in setting the standard of care for negligence. Sometimes the statute is given greater
weight than others. Compare Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987, 300 N.Y.S.
1051 (1939) with Daggett v. Keshner, 284 A.D. 733 (1954). The nuances of state court use
of statutes in tort are elaborated in Fricke, The Judicial Nature of the Action on the
Statute, 76 L. Q. Rav. 240 (1960); Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil
Litigation, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 622 (1951); James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in
1979]
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the statutory valuing of employment, free from pressure by illegal
aliens, is to be related to Abelardo Flores and the other laborers
who struck against George Braun Slaughterhouse in order to im-
prove their bargaining position. It is the last point at which the
judge can decide how the statutory valuing of medical care for
indigents is to be related to the denial of medical services to Floyd
Stanturf. The finality of these damage claims is apparent by
contrasting them with claims for preventive relief.46 The Supreme
Court refused to recognize a cause of action when commuter pas-
sengers sought to enjoin a scheduled cut in railroad service in
Illinois. The justices felt that interference by injunction would
diminish the efficacy of the congressional scheme whereby Amtrak
was to pare unprofitable routes to save viable ones.47 After the
Supreme Court's decision there was still the opportunity for the
courts to provide damages in the future to commuters injured by
any cut in service that violated the Rail Passenger Act.48 Congress
may have perceived the same difference between preventive relicf
and damages when it reserved equitable powers to the Secretary of
Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal Hazard-
Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95 (1950); Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Stan.
dards, 53 CALxF. L. REV. 189 (1965); Loundes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legisla-
tion, 16 MINN. L. Rlv. 361 (1932); Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in
Negligence Actions, 28 TEx. L. REv. 143 (1949); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 21 (1949); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private
Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1914); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation
of New Torts, 48 COLuM. L. REv. 456 (1948).
It is usually the extent of the development of tort doctrine in a particular jurisdic-
tion that determines the likelihood that plaintiff will be able to seek damages. Distinct
claims based on a federal statute in state court are rare.
[We have found no case, and counsel have cited none, wherein a state court has
carved out the form, content and bounds of such a remedy from a federal statute
when the statute is totally silent on the subject. On the contrary, the language
of the federal cases would seem to direct that the form, nature and perimeters of
the federal right are to be forged and defined by the federal courts ....
Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217, 223, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (1972). Occasionally, the
state courts treat the question as one of implying a remedy from statute-though that hardly
seems necessary for a court of unlimited jurisdiction with a general law of tort. In Kube
v. Kube, 193 Neb. 559, 227 N.W.2d 860 (1975), the court talks in terms of an implied
right of action but does not provide one.
46. Injunctive relief is often preferred, especially when the suit potentially involves
the cumulated damages of many plaintiffs. Wright's first hypothesis for further study of
remedies was that "[p]reventive relief is the most desirable kind of relief." Wright, The
Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 381 (1955). Whether more
desirable or only more desired, this hypothesis has not been studied any more than in
1955, when Wright advocated such an inquiry.
47. National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453, 461-62
(1974).
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1976).
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ous Substances Act,49 but imposed no limitation on who might
seek damages.50
In common law decisions, the judge both determines what is
important enough to protect and whether damages for injury can
be sought. When the court performs both roles, it seldom recog-
nizes an interest until it is ready to provide relief to the persons
injured. Thus it need never discuss the relation of private recovery
and public welfare. 1 By contrast, the body making choices about
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1976). In injunction actions to enforce 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976),
the child labor provisions, the Secretary's actions are subject to the direction and control
of the Attorney General. Similarly, the Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274
(1976), provides: "all . . . injunction proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain
violations of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States." Id. § 1268.
When individuals are injured, or about to be injured, and seek injunctive relief,
writers often voice concern that this will interfere with complex and delicate administra-
tive planning, especially when the agency has a legislative mandate to obtain compliance
informally. For example, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1684
(1976), directs that the Secretary, before seeking an injunction, should whenever practical,
give notice to violators, afford an opportunity for the violator to present his views and
provide a reasonable opportunity for compliance. Id. § 1679. The concern is described in
detail in particular statutory contexts in Securities Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
and Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975). By contrast, espe-
cially when damages rather than injunctive relief are sought, some judges assume there is
no conflict between the needs of the administrator and the desires of the private claimant.
Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., 501 F.2d 104, 108 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Those employees
wishing to sue in his or her own behalf can only lighten the burden of the Secretary and
increase the effectiveness of the Act."); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 414 (E.D.
La. 1969). The problem is less significant when damages after the fact of injury are sought,
and can probably be resolved in either instance through the concept of primary jurisdic-
tion in the relevant agency. That doctrine is summarized and applied in Eisman v. Pan
Am. World Airlines, 336 F. Supp. 543, 547 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and in Corum v. Beth Israel
Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf. Stewart v. Travelers Ins. Corp., 503
F.2d 108, 113 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The issues raised in § 1674 (a) claims are simple ones, not
requiring special knowledge of a particular industry or type of employer.").
51. The Illinois Court of Appeals proved an exception when it dismissed a complaint
by a child against a parent who caused the child to be born illegitimate. Zepeda v. Ze-
peda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1936). The court "designate[d] the wrong com-
mitted herein as a tort," but dismissed the action "because of our belief that lawmaking,
while inherent in the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the result could
be as sweeping as here." Id. at 262, 190 N.E.2d at 859. Still, the judge writing for the
majority was aware "that an action for damages is implicit in any wrong that is called a
tort ... (and] it may be inconsistent to say, as we do, that the plaintiff has been injured
by a tortious act and then to question, as we do, his right to maintain an action to recover
for this act." Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 857-58. The circularity that can occur between
right and remedy in common law-and which often does in tort-is apparent in the
maxim ubi ius ibi remedium, "for every right there is a remedy"; for if there is no
remedy, then there is no right. Likewise, J. FRANK, COURTs ON TRIAL (1940) collapsed
questions of right and remedy, taking the eminently pragmatic view that a legal right is
a lawsuit won. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), allows
courts to determine rights "whether or not further relief is or could be sought," but 28




what constitutes the public good in the federal statutory damage
cases is separate from that determining whether the person injured
is entitled to seek damages. The cases are ones where the statute
neither grants nor precludes such suits. Congress' determination
of what constitutes the public good is found in statutes that either
prohibit or require certain conduct. The statute indicates that the
risk dealt with is no longer one of the background risks that must
be accepted as part of the price of living in a complex society.
2
Thus, the legislature has determined that it is in the public inter-
est that the abandonment of natural gas service be controlled by
a public agency and that employees not be discharged for reporting
statutory violations. What a court then does with these legislative
messages is a judicial choice. Judges in the Eighth Circuit have
permitted Farmland Industries to seek damages from Kansas-
Nebraska Gas for the abandonment of natural gas service without
Federal Power Commission permission. Judges in the District of
Columbia Circuit have denied Diana Powell the opportunity to
seek damages for her discharge in retaliation for reporting wage
and hour violations. But whether or not they face what their answer
says, judges in these cases must determine the relation between
the public good and the individual claim. They cannot simply
deny the former until they are willing to seriously consider the
latter.
Since the institutional division of labor between Congress
and court in these cases separates the determination of what con-
stitutes the public good from the determination of the necessity
of private recovery for injury, only the question of the relation be-
tween the two remains. The question is isolated in these cases,
and cannot be postponed, whether or not it is faced.
B. Utilitarian Assumptions in Operation
Federal judges in deciding the cases described consistently
focus on public concerns to the exclusion of the claims of the
parties involved.53 That they take this level of inquiry as a given
52. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 537, 543 (1972).
53. Commentators have seldom gone further than the courts. The casenote tradition
tends to prevail; such discussion as there is reacts to a case and thus to a particular statute.
Longer articles tend to be multiple casenotes. Commentators thus largely describe and
sometimes criticize judicial opinions. But since the criticism tends to go to the adequacies
of judicial logic given judicial premises, or to judicial success in meeting the goals the
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is reflected in the language used throughout the decisions. Judges
ask in their opinions "does the statute imply a remedy?", not "do
I choose to provide a remedy based on the statute?" The judges
repeatedly use certain techniques in their opinions: (1) they treat
the question about the relationship of public and individual good
as one about the existence of a cause of action, which distances
them from the parties; (2) they focus on the legislature rather than
the parties, hoping to find a legislative answer; and (3) they treat
public issues as determinative without explaining that choice.
These techniques are detailed in the following sections and I argue
that each is a choice, that the judges are not compelled to any of
these approaches.
1. Keeping distance from the parties
It has been clear since Bell v. Hood54 that federal courts have
jurisdiction over cases in which the damages sought are based on
violations of federal statutes that do not provide for damage ac-
tions. The courts have consistently acted on that assumption.5 5 In
disposing of these cases, judges must determine whether there is
a cause of action and, if there is, whether damages are an appropri-
ate remedy. Although each issue must be decided, emphasis and
attention can and do vary among them. 6
judges set, there is little inquiry about questions the judges do not raise and about the
basic role of particular sorts of remedies in our jurisprudence. Some articles go beyond
reporting judicial formulations. See, e.g., Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963) (the oft-cited classic, for the author pro-
vided some clarity and sorted out basic problems before the courts had done so). O'Neil,
Public Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 231 (1964) worried
generally about the unintended elimination of existing common law rights by the passage
of statutes. In Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to
Ash, 1 J. Coax. L. 371, 389 (1976), the authors attempted to formulate a new test, sug-
gesting that the test of Amtrak and Ash was too restrictive. In Comment, Private Reme-
dies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation
and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1972), the author described two modes of judicial
decision which vary in their attitude toward statute. While I do not find the distinction
particularly useful, it is an attempt to find some organizing principle for a large number
of cases-beyond what the judges talk about.
54. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). This is so despite the occasional opinion dis-
missing plaintiff's claim for lack of jurisdiction.
55. See, e.g., Britton v. Grace Line Inc., 214 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (citing
Bonner v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 177 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1949)).
56. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of an injunction against the termi-
nation of certain railroad lines in National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Pass., 414 U.S. 453, 467 (1974), observed that "[t]he Court phrases the question in terms
of whether a 'right of action' exists, saying no question of 'standing' or 'jurisdiction' is
1979]
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Federal courts now virtually always make the existence of a
cause of action the only crucial question, and in so doing they
keep their distance from the individuals who make the claim."
The existence of a cause of action is determined by looking to the
legislature and to state law. The facts are treated hypothetically, if
at all. The courts ask
[f]irst, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," . .. that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the under-
lying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff ... and finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?58
The distance is increased by the assumption that determining the
existence of a cause of action is only a matter of sorting among
courts. The judge who denies a cause of action may view the de-
cision as holding only that "there is no relief in this court," or that
"there is no relief on this theory."5' 9
presented. Whatever the merits of distinction between these three concepts may be in
some situations, the difference here is only a matter of semantics." I am inclined to think
that the choice often makes a difference; that certain concerns are more easily raised
under one concept than another. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE LJ. 425 (1974).
57. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 69 (1975), a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel objected
to the use that the Chairman of the Board of Directors had made of general corporate
funds in the 1972 election. Cort had advertised for fair treatment of the business com-
munity in the campaign and mailed circulars on that topic. Ash claimed that this use of
corporate funds violated the Corrupt Practices Act limitations on political contributions
and purchases, and that Cort would have been liable under the Act for a fine of up to
$1,000 and imprisonment for up to one year; if the violation was willful, a fine of 510,000
and two years imprisonment could have been imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976). In deciding
the claim against Cort, the Court found "no occasion to address the questions whether
§ 610 properly construed proscribes the expenditures alleged in this case." 422 U.S. at
69-70.
58. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). More recently, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 24-37 (1977), Justice Burger gave primary attention to finding the answer in
the legislative history, aftervards using the analysis from Cort to confirm conclusions
reached on the basis of the legislative history. 430 U.S. at 37. Justice Stevens questioned
whether Cort provided the appropriate standards. 430 U.S. at 66.
59. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958) observe that:
English courts had never been accustomed to face the question of right of action
or no right of action squarely and systematically. In denying relief they were used
simply to saying "This form of action does not lie" or "There is no remedy for you
in this court." With the advent of a single form of action, their tradition gave
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There is an alternative to the distance that comes with letting
legislative intent and the possibility of recovery "somewhere else"
decide these cases. In elaborating that alternative it needs to be
understood that while it is sometimes true that relief can be had
in the state courts or on another federal basis, a federal judge in
denying a cause of action based on federal statute can usually only
guess whether that is true, and will sometimes effectively be saying
to plaintiff, "you cannot ask for damages anywhere." 60 Realizing
that, it is entirely possible to change the questions for determining
the existence of a cause of action from ones of actual intent of the
legislature to ones of possibility-could the legislature rationally
have intended the statute to benefit the claimant, and was the in-
jury caused by conduct that violated the statute."' A court deciding
a case similar to Farmland Industries' claim against Kansas-Ne-
them no body of systematic thought for dealing with the fundamental questions
of remedy vel non. American courts inherited this vacuum of basic jurispruden-
tial thinking.
Id. at 500.
60. A federal judge's decision to leave the plaintiff's claim to a state court is based
on a "public issue," unrelated to the parties before the court, when it is based on concerns
about federalism, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); concerns about judicial resources,
Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972); or about legislative primacy on
questions related to statute, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The federal
courts that choose to leave the question of damages for injury defined by statute to the
states cannot assume that state tort law will recognize and respond to the injury, for state
courts too can choose to decide their cases on issues unrelated to the particular parties.
The variability of state court treatment of injury defined by violation of statute insures
that the federal courts cannot leave the case to the state courts because of the concerns
listed above and still be assured that the interests of the particular parties will be attended.
When it is clear that there can be no recourse to the state courts, the federal choice
is squarely presented. The judge in Farmland Indus. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co.,
349 F. Supp. 670, 681 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973), concluded that
"[a]warding of damages for loss [not an increase in rates] arising from the unauthorized
abandonment cannot be made, apparently, in any forum except the federal court." Like-
wise, in the cases where plaintiff claims a common law right to continued employment,
there will often be no recognized state action. Comment, A Common Law Action for the
Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASrINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
61. This form of inquiry is similar to equal protection analysis, where the courts
have asked whether there is a rational relation between the means used in the statute and
the end of the statute-that "end" often intuited by the courts. Its use would have changed
part of the opinion in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for there the court acknowledged
that both a primary and secondary purpose could be derived from the statute through the
legislative history. The court was unwilling to facilitate the purpose of protecting share-
holder funds from corporate use in elections for it thought that purpose "at best . ..
secondary." Id. at 81. Rather, the court focused on protection of the electoral process,
which it took to be the "primary purpose." The existence of multiple purposes is more
troublesome when the purpose on which plaintiff relies is inconsistent with what the court
sees as the primary purpose. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Moen v.
Las Vegas Int'l Hotel, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D. Nev. 1975), af'd, 554 F.2d 1069 (9th
Cir. 1977).
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braska Gas could ask whether Congress could have rationally in-
tended to benefit a commercial customer by requiring under the
Natural Gas Act that a seller of natural gas, operating under a
certificate of convenience and necessity, obtain Federal Power Com-
mission permission before abandoning service. Evaluating a claim
like Stanturf's against Wright Memorial Hospital a court could ask
whether Congress could have rationally intended to benefit in-
digent patients by requiring federally funded hospitals, unless
excepted for financial reasons, to provide a reasonable volume of
services to indigents. 2 Similarly, Doak's claim against Claxton
could have depended on whether Congress could have rationally
intended to benefit persons working near piped natural gas. When
the legislature could have rationally intended to benefit a plaintiff
in passing a statute-the case whenever a plaintiff's injury was a
foreseeable consequence of a statutory violation 63-then the court
would go on to consider whether the injured plaintiff should be
allowed to seek damages. 4 Given this alternative, distance from
62. Since a "reasonable volume" does not necessarily provide care for all needs of all
indigents, problems are created for any single plaintiff's claim. A plaintiff would have to
establish that the failure to provide the services required by statute was the conduct that
caused his or her injury. If the standardized percent of budget that constitutes by regu-
lation a "reasonable volume" would have been exhausted by services given higher priori.
ties, the indigent who is denied a lower priority service may not have been injured by the
failure to provide the statutorily required amount of service.
63. So stated, this definition of rational legislative intention draws on tort concepts
of foreseeability. That would seem to make sense if damages provided for by statutes are
seen as part of tort. True, foreseeability as a limiting concept is often accused of provid-
ing little aid or comfort. But there are instances where its use would incline one to say
that no legislature would rationally have chosen to benefit plaintiff by a particular statu-
tory creation. In Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir, 1975), first
class passengers on a European tour complained that the accommodations and services
provided were not those promised. They then alleged that "tourist class services were
superior to their own 'first class' accommodations." Id. at 335. Their claim was that the
Federal Aviation Act, which prohibits discrimination by a regulated air carrier, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (1976), provided a basis for their claim for damages. The court denied relief
noting that "if it were discrimination, then every breach of a contract by an airline would
give rise to a private cause of action under § 1374 (b). There would always be another
unbreached contract to which the disgruntled air passenger could compare the services
performed to him." 523 F.2d at 335 (footnote omitted). In terms of foreseeability, it seems
unlikely that Congress would choose to try to stop breaches of contract by airlines by pro-
hibiting them from discriminating against passengers.
64. Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956), was a very early
implied remedy case based on a statute prohibiting airline discrimination in provision of
services. In subsequent cases the courts worked out the details of a cause of action: Archi-
bald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Trans.
world Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Flores v. Pan Am. World Airways, 259 F. Supp. 402
(P.R. 1966). This statutory area is one of very few where cases have come back to the
courts for attention once the existence of a cause of action has been recognized.
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the parties and attention to issues which transcend the parties is a
judicial choice.
2. Attributing the answer to the legislature
When the legislature has made a choice in the statute about
the treatment of persons injured, the courts do not have to under-
take that task. Congress chose to allow injured parties to seek dam-
ages under the 1971 amendments to the Economic Stabilization
Act of 197065 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1967.6 Congress
appears to have chosen to prohibit injured parties from recovering
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act.
6 7
When the legislature has made no choice about damages explicit in
the statute, judges and commentators continue to look for a legis-
lative choice in the legislative history.68 Sometimes the search is
general, as when the Supreme Court, "[i]n determining whether
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one," asks "is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
65. Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c) (1976).
67. E.g., The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 provides:
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect
any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and
employees under any law with respect to injuries, disease or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
Id. § 653 (b) (4) (1976).
In the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1684 (1976), Congress pro-
vided that "[t]he remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in
substitution for any other remedies provided by law." Id. § 1675 (e). More important, it
is provided that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the common law or statutory tort
liability of any person." Id. § 1677 (b).
68. Sometimes judges urge caution in this search of legislative history. In Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977), Justice Burger warned about the difficulties in
relying on legislative history before going on to do so. "Reliance on legislative history in
divining the intent of Congress is, as has often been observed, a step to be taken cau-
tiously .... As Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us; 'We must be wary against interpo-
lating our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative provisions' . . . . ... A rare
exception to reliance on legislative history is in Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F.
Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1970):
We do not feel that it is necessary to delve into the legislative history of the Hill-
Burton Act in order to reach this conclusion. Rather, we are of the opinion that
the act, by its own terms, makes it plain that persons unable to pay for medical
services are one of the chief sets of beneficiaries of this legislation. It is a matter
of the clearest logic that the only real beneficiaries of a hospital program are the
people who need or may need medical treatment.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?""9 On the
other hand, at times the search is for something very specific:
Did Congress by the pertinent provisions of the Small Business Act
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and the
requirement that a bidder prior to the opening of the bids make a
good faith certification respecting his status as a small-business
concern manifest an intent, in the event that certification was
untrue and such bidder was awarded the contract, to give a cause
of action against such bidder to the next lowest bidder for loss
of profits? 70
A court, in so determining the question to be answered, limits its
task to pronouncing the legislature's choice about the public good.
By so defining the judicial task, the court avoids examining the
assumption on which it would act had the legislature not provided
the answer. The limits to this approach become apparent when
one examines further what the courts try to do and what they have
to work with.
In their search for a legislative answer the courts treat legisla-
tive choice scientifically, as something that can be discovered and
described. Discovery is taken to be a function of finding the right
way to study the phenomenon and doing so with sufficient care
and diligence.7 1 The increasing distribution of legislative hearings
and documents reinforces the aura of scientific knowledge-"that
it [is] public and not private, explicit and not 'secret', available in
a common fund for use by all who can learn. '72 But, contrary to
the scientific ideal, legislative intent about damages for persons
injured by statutory violation evades discovery and description.
This is so because the process of passing a statute involves "legisla-
69. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
70. Royal Serv., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86, 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
71. For example, in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 452 (3rd Cir. 1976), the judge faced a class action claim for $75 per
member based on the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976). In reaching the deci-
sion to allow the claim, he observed, "what slim evidence of congressional intent there is
suggests to this Court that a private right of action for violation of the Aviation Act was
within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted the statute." 405 F. Supp. at 440
(emphasis added).
72. EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 7 (D. Lerner ed. 1958). The instinct to avoid choice by
seeing the answer as dictated by fact grows out of uncertainty about the basis for choosing
among values. It is not a reaction confined to the courts. See Ackerman, Book Review, 103
DAEDALUS 119, 122-23 (1974) (J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND) "[T]he bulk of legal
writing in the academy, lawyer's brief, and judicial opinions still follows the classic Har-
vard mode of conducting a reasoned search among legal materials for 'the' legally correct
doctrine," assuming as fact that there is one.
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tive choice" on only a core of issues, and remedies for private
injury are usually subject to that part of the process where it is
choice that is avoided."
The process of legislation is described as one of compromise
among legislators and among interest groups by the writers who
use that compromise to validate the choices made, and by those
who attack it as undemocratic.7 4 Evidence of compromise is taken
to indicate "legislative choice." Avoidance of choice is the less
evident part of the process, yet it is particularly important as a
complement to compromise in getting legislation passed. 75 It is
the less evident part of the process, less understood, and particu-
larly important here. The interplay of avoidance and compromise
is detailed in the following abstract of the legislative process.
A legislator can support a statute if he or she can put together
73. When this is so, inference is from silence. These inferences from congressional
silence are drawn in two ways-that Congress was capable of clearly and directly providing
that which is missing and therefore must have chosen to reject it, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1042 (1972); or that Congress could have provided that which is missing and in
failing to do so choose to leave that issue open. Justice White in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), derived legislative intent from the overall structure of the
Civil Rights Act where some titles provided for a private cause of action but others did
not. In the final line up on this issue "[flour Justices are apparently of the view that such
a private cause of action exists, and four Justices assume it for the purposes of this case."
Id. at 379-80. Justice White was unwilling "merely to assume an affirmative answer," id.
at 380, and from his discussion concluded that no private cause of action was intended
for a Title VI claim.
The court in Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 414 (E.D. La. 1969), suggested
that "[i]nferences drawn from Congressional silence are rarely useful, and frequently
wrong," and urged attention rather on "the legislative product . .. the language that
was constitutionally enacted into law." The court in Flintkote and Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 863 (1930) criticize the former approach. The most elaborate
discussion of congressional silence in Bikl1, Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. REv. 200
(1924), where the author attempted to determine whether federal action on the commerce
clause precluded subsequent state action in the same area or only required state action
consistent with the congressional action.
74. T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) describes "interest-group liberalism"
as the currently predominant public philosophy. It turns, as he describes it, on the
assumption that "one organized group can be found effectively answering and checking
some other organized group as it seeks to prosecute its claims against society." Id. at 71.
The legislature is expected to represent the same process. Madison urged something like
this view in what G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969), describes
as a "kinetic theory of politics." "[S]uch a crumbling of political and social interests, such
an atomization of authority, such a parcelling of power . . . creating such a multiplicity
and a scattering of designs and passions," that no combination could control. "Yet out of
the clashing and checking of this diversity Madison believed the public good, the true
perfection of the whole, would somehow arise." Id. at 605. Lowi criticizes this view.
75. E. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948) ("Agreement is then pos-
sible [in a legislature] only through escape to a higher level of discourse with greater
ambiguity." Id. at 31.)
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an acceptable and credible set of assumptions about what a statute
means and the effect it will have. The larger the number of com-
binations of assumptions that exist, the broader the potential range
of supporters. The initial combinations of assumptions about func-
tion, enforcement and audience for a statute are many and varied
when silence is mixed with explicit provision." The process of
actually passing the statute is then one of narrowing these com-
binations. Certain issues become focused and critical. The first
reduction of possible combinations occurs when those issues are
explicitly dealt with in the statute, rather than left to silence and
autonomous judicial or regulatory action.77 Once an issue is written
into the statute, the remaining combinations are determined by
76. Legislators may assume that the function of a proposed statute is to declare
values for the collective, or to regulate conduct, or to regularize conditions, or to avoid
more stringent regulation, or to facilitate collateral goals-one, some or all of these. For
example, G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963) sees business as favoring and facilitating regulation for its own
purposes, rather than regulation having been simply imposed upon business by reform
efforts. A legislator may anticipate any of a variety of responses from the audiences to
whom he or she takes the statute to be relevant. An executive agency may choose to
enforce the provision rigorously, normally, or hardly at all, depending on its perception
of legislative intent, its own evaluation of the situation, or the resources made available
to it. It may accomplish the result without legislative authorization. A judge may choose
to respond to a statute at any of the levels Pound describes, ranging from receiving the
statute fully into the body of law, and reasoning from it in preference to judge-made
rules, to giving it "a strict and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those
cases which it covers expressly." Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAmv. L. REv.
383, 385 (1908). The choice may turn on perception of the importance of legislative crea-
tions, assumptions about legislative intent, assumptions about executive enforcement of
judicial choices on the issue, assessment of the needs of a public or of the parties, or on
plain personal preference. A court may reach the same result without a statute, relying
on judicial rather than legislative creation. A beneficiary of the statute, depending on his
or her perception of enforcement, may not change position, may rely on what lie or she
takes the statute's assurance to be or may never know of the statute's existence. Those
controlled by the statute, depending on perceptions of enforcement and the costs of com-
pliance, may comply, may enjoy the predictability the statute provides, may ignore the
statute or may likewise never know of the statute. A state, under a federal statute, may
take the statute as an imposition on its domain, as shifting considerable expense from the
state and providing needed services or as insignificant.
Variables such as obligations owed for votes given on other legislation, party loyalty,
loyalty to individual legislators or interests, or campaign pressures-all unrelated to the
substance of an act-can multiply the possible combinations of assumptions about a statute
still further. A. MCADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION (1964) provides a
wealth of examples. See also E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973). Other stat-
utes, particularly those for appropriations, provide later opportunities to reinforce or
negate earlier commitments.
77. Legislators chose affirmatively to provide that the Occupational Safety and
Health Commission give consideration in assessing penalties to "the size of the business
of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the em.
ployer, and the history of previous violations." 29 U.S.C. § 666 (i) (1976). Thus legislators
considering the bill could no longer assume that the enforcement agency might or might
not think itself free to vary penalties on those considerations.
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the maximum and minimum expansion the language chosen for
the provision will bear-and that may be considerable."' On some
occasions, in an attempt to escape some of the vagaries of language,
legislators set out both the minimum and maximum expanses for
the language used. Thus Congress provided in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 9 that "nothing in this Act shall be construed
to . .-. enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the
common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers
and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases or
death of employees arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment."80
78. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1980). J. FRANK, CoURrs
ON TRIAL 292-309 (1940) contains a chapter on "Words and Music: Legislation and Judi-
cial Interpretation." In the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1976), the process by which the Secretary of Labor is to produce regulations was explicitly
described, as was the standard by which the courts were to review them. The procedures
provide for notice and comment and allow for public hearing on request. Id. § 655 (b).
Any person adversely affected by a standard issued may petition for judicial review
wherein "[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." Id. § 655 (f). But the House and
Senate had agreed in conference that they would adopt the Senate's informal mode of
producing regulations and the House's standard of review of those regulations--"substan-
tial evidence" on the record. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970). The
trade-off is described in Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKE L.J.
459 and in Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
342, 849 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942 (1974). Unfortunately, the informal
method of production did not provide the record traditionally required for that standard
of review. The courts have managed nonetheless to rework the meaning of "substantial
evidence on the record" so that this standard of review can be applied to the regulations.
See cases cited in Currie, OSHA, 1976 A.B.F. RsEtAcH J. 1126-33 (esp. n.112); Society of
the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975);
Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfr. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); National Roofing Contractors Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 1294
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
80. Id. § 653 (b) (4). This has been construed to exclude the possibility of a federal
court creating a remedy in damages. Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1974); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1974); Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 1240 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Hare v. Federal Express & Warehouse Co., 359 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Miss. 1973); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), aff'd per
curiam, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
If it were meant to preserve the traditional judicial choice to use the regulations and
the statute to help set a standard of care in a state law action in negligence, it has only
sometimes done so. In Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240, 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1974),
a case in federal court because of diversity jurisdiction, Chief Judge Keady determined that
under Mississippi negligence law, OSHA standards may not be taken into account as evi-
dence of what constitutes due care. He assumed that the reason for reliance on doctrines of
negligence per se is "a judicial addition to statutory penalties thought to be inadequate to
the purposes the legislative branch sought to promote." Since he thought that same reason
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In the reductions just described, legislators confined and
limited the combinations of possible assumptions about the statute,
and their "choices" are to some degree accessible."1 When multiple
interpretations are not confined, there is no singular legislative
"choice," "desire," or "intent" to be discovered beyond the desire,
purpose or intent to assure passage of the provision. 2 Committee
reports and statements made by sponsors on the floor only tell us
the views of the committee or the sponsor.8  But the point of not
cementing that view into the statute is often to allow those who
disagree with it to support the bill nonetheless.84 I suggest that it
was the basis for the implied remedy cases, he felt controlled by the outcome of the federal
question cases based directly on OSHA. See generally Comment, The Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970: Its Role in Civil Litigation, 28 Sw. L.J. 999 (1974); Comment,
Federal Common Law Remedies Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
47 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1972). Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, Van Schaick & Sheehy,
Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work Under Safe Conditions,
64 CALIF. L. REv. 702 (1976) argue that private actions in state courts by employees to
enjoin unsafe working conditions under traditional principles of equity are not precluded
by OSHA.
In passing the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1684 (1976), Con-
gress provided that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the common law or statutory
tort liability of any person." Id. § 1677 (b). That could be read to prohibit enlargement
or diminution of liability. But see H.R. RE,. No. 1390, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3223, 3239 ("This language is designed to assure
that the tort liability of any person existing under common law or any statute will not
be relieved by reason of the enactment of this legislation or compliance with its provi-
sions." (emphasis added)).
81. It can be said that Congress chose to relate OSHA penalties to the character and
history of the defendant, produce and review OSHA regulations by a particular method
and set the extent to which the courts could build on OSHA. It was not necessary for
passage of OSHA to confine choice on many other issues.
82. There is a long standing debate on this issue between Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 HARv. L. Rlv. 863 (1930) and Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation",
43 H Rv. L. REv. 886 (1930). The writers who have been drawn to each side of the debate
are described in MacCullum, Legislative Intent, YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
83. Justice Brandeis, in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300
U.S. 440 (1937), describes the classical hierarchy of useful legislative sources:
reports of Congressional committees which have considered the measure . . . .
exposition of the bill on the floor of Congress by those in charge of or sponsor-
ing the legislation . . . comparison of successive drafts or amendments of the
measure ... . debates in general in order to show common agreement on pur-
pose as distinguished from interpretation of particular phraseology ....
Id. at 464 n.8 (citations omitted). For descriptions of the use of legislative history, see
Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Repprts, 1 U. CH. L. REv. 81 (1933); Jones,
Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737 (1940); Note, Conference Com-
mittee Materials in Interpreting Statutes, 4 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1952).
84. For example, Representative Hays, Chairman of the Conference Committee on
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 which created the Federal Elec-
tion Commission, stated that "[t]he delicately balanced scheme of procedures and remedies
set out in the act is intended to be the exclusive means for vindicating the rights and
declaring the duties stated therein." 120 CONG. REC. 35, 134 (1974) (emphasis added). If
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is in this area of unconfined choice that remedies for injured in-
dividuals will usually fall. Except in compensation statutes, reme-
dies for injured persons are an addendum-a complement to some
other problem of primary concern. At any rate, I have chosen to
consider those instances where the choice of remedy is not confined
by language in the statute.
Assuming the open ended nature of the legislative process,
the absence of legislative choice combined with actual choice, and
the likelihood that damages for persons injured by statutory viola-
tion will usually not be the subject of any choice, then whichever
party is told to produce persuasive evidence of legislative intent
about damages will lose. The court, in relying on legislative choice,
effectively determines outcome by the question it chooses.,, So it
appears when one sorts the cases-when the court says that it will
not provide damages unless there is evidence of legislative intent
that they be made available, the plaintiff will usually lose. Judge
Barrett for the Tenth Circuit, denying a cause of action under
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 6 explained that "[i]n
the absence of congressional intent to the contrary, we hold that
the penal sanctions in the act are exclusive. ' 87 The same judge,
denying a cause of action under the Immigration and Nationality
Act concluded that "[t]here is no indication that Congress intended
to create a private cause of action under the Act. ' 88 Judge Christie
in the Southern District of West Virginia, denied a cause of action
under the anti-garnishment provisions of the Consumer Credit
that statement was not accompanied by statutory limitations making the procedures and
remedies exclusive, then the bill could be supported both by those who thought the pro-
cedures and remedies should be exclusive and by those who assumed the courts might
provide another procedure or remedy when appropriate. As passed, the bill did provide
that "[t]he Commission shall have exclusive primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil
enforcement of such provisions." 2 U.S.CA. § 437b (1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). As passed, the
statute leaves open whether damage actions will be taken by the courts to be part of
"civil enforcement." Only so much cement was added.
85. Gunther describes the same sort of correlation between the question asked and
answer found in equal protection doctrine. When the Court had asked whether there was
a relation between the statute passed and the end set, the answer was almost always yes.
When the Court had asked whether conduct falling under strict scrutiny as affecting a
fundamental interest or a suspect classification was justified, the answer was almost
always no. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H~Av. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
86. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976).
87. Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
US. 1042 (1972).
88. 456 F.2d at 894.
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Protection Act, 9 because "a private right of action for violation of
the anti-garnishment provisions of Subchapter II of the Act was
neither provided for nor contemplated by Congress in enacting
this legislation." 90
When, on occasion, a court says that it will make damages
available unless there is evidence of legislative choice to preclude
them, the defendant will usually lose.0 1 Judge Brown, in dissent,
explained that he would find a cause of action under the anti-
retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act because
"[t]he intent of the Act . . . fails to limit Ms. Martinez' claim." 2
In a case that acknowledged a cause of action under the act creat-
ing the Federal Employment Service, 93 Judge Brown ruled that it
is not decisive that there is "no explicit indication in the regula-
tions or the Act that the workers were to have the opportunity to
protect such conferred interest . . . since the existence of such
an explicit grant of a remedy is not necessary.
01 4
There is an obvious alternative to attributing choice to the
legislature when the statute does not settle the relation between
public pronouncement and individual claim, and when the evi-
dence of legislative intent on the issue is ambiguous. A judge
might describe what the legislature seems to have valued generally
and ask how it should relate that to an individual who has been
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976).
90. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 379
(4th Cir. 1974). In Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972).
vacated, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973), the court took it to be axiomatic that in the absence
of congressional intent to the contrary, a federal statute under certain conditions implies
a private right of action, but nonetheless found "a cognizable and purposeful omission."
Id. at 1059.
91. See, e.g., Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1970) ("In the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, the courts are free
to fashion the appropriate civil remedies." Id. at 1033.); Abernathy v. Schenley Indus.,
420 F. Supp. I (W.D. N.C. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978) ('If any defendant is
able to supply any legislative history that tends to show Congress did not intend to allow
a private right of action under the statutes, I will reconsider the motions." Id. at 2.);
Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("[t]he legislature may withhold from
injured parties the right to recover damages arising from the violation of a statute, but
the right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not ex-
pressly denied, the intention to withhold should appear very clearly and plainly." Id. at
627.); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961)
("Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which affirmatively
indicates that they are intended. On the contrary, they are implied unless the legislation
evidences a contrary intention." Id. at 224.).
92. Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., 501 F.2d 104, 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
93. National Employment System (Wagner-Peyser) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
94. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969).
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injured." Asking that, judges may still respond to deeply engrained
notions of constitutionally defined roles for court and legislature,
but arguments that cut against those concerns or that support the
complementarity of the two will not have been precluded. Again,
the existence of an alternative approach means that a judicial
choice is being made, if not discussed.
Judges who attempt to attribute the choice to the legislature
accept the legislature's basis for choice-and that basis is not often
one focused on the needs of individuals who may be injured. In
fact, it is the judicial placing of the burden of producing evidence
of legislative choice that has tended to determine the outcome of
these cases. The question posed by the judge, not a choice by the
legislature, provides the answer. The allocation of the burden,
usually to the claimant, and the ramifications of imposing it are
not discussed, nor are the alternative questions.
3. Formulating questions in terms of the public
When courts make the existence of a cause of action their
primary concern, and when they attempt to derive an answer from
the legislature, they effectively confine their attention to concerns
beyond the particular parties involved. Their concern with the
public is implicit. The preference to respond to public concerns is
explicit when judges base their decisions on the adequacy of en-
forcement resources, on needed respect for the states, or on the
necessity of a separation of powers.
For some courts, the explicit characterization of a statute as
95. When legislative choices are complex, conditional or contradictory, so is tfe
valuing. For example, while health care for indigents was important enough to require
hospitals constructed with federal funds to provide "a reasonable volume of services" to
indigents, Stanturf could claim no such services if "a reasonable volume" of such services
had already been given, or the hospital had been granted an exception. Again, although
opportunities for small businesses were thought important enough for certain government
contracts to be set aside for them, the valuing is not unconditional. Regulations promul-
gated by the Small Business Administration provide that a government contracting agency
can proceed with what has been designated a "small business set-aside contract," despite
questions about whether the party obtaining the contract is a small business, where "fur-
ther delay in awarding the contract would be disadvantageous to the government." 41
C.F.R. § 1-1.703 (2) (e) (1979). Thus, Royal Services, once it establishes that Maintenance,
Inc. is not a small business, may have no claim based on the Small Business Act for the
profits that Maintenance earns if it has been allowed to continue with the contract because
of government necessity. The same complexity in determining what it is that is valued
exists whether the choice is made by a legislature in statute, an executive in executive
order, or an administrative agency in regulation.
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public is the end of the matter. Individual claims based on it are
denied. Royal Services was told that it would not be able to recover
from the company that falsely claimed under the Small Business
Act to be a "small business," and thereby won the contract that
Royal would have otherwise received. "We think the purpose [of
the statute] was public in character, viz., the preservation and ex-
pansion of full and free competition to insure the Nation's eco-
nomic well-being and security . . ... , Doak was denied damages
for his injuries from the explosion of a natural gas pipeline in part
because the court determined from the legislative history that "[i]t
is clear ...that the purpose of the [Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act] is the safety and protection of the public."' 7 Leonel Sanchez
and other migrant workers unsuccessfully sought damages on the
claim that Great Western Employment Agency "induced them to
come to Colorado by misrepresenting the amount of wages to be
paid, the conditions of housing to be provided, and the conditions
for return transportation, all in violation of the Farm Labor Con-
tractor Registration Act." They were told by Judge Barrett for the
Tenth Circuit that "this court will not fashion civil remedies from
federal regulatory statutes except where compelling federal inter-
est of a governmental nature exists."08
More often judges separate the characterization of the statute
as public from the conclusion about individual claims, and elabo-
rate their notions of the public import of private claims. The first
and most focused of these more detailed public inquiries concerns
the adequacy of enforcement of the underlying statute. 90 This in-
96. Royal Serv., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86, 92 (5th Cir. 1966). The Ninth
Circuit rejected this conclusion in Savini Constr. Co. v. Crooks Bros. Constr. Co., 540 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1974). "Since the public interest is furthered under the Act only by protect.
ing individual small businesses, it cannot be said that the latter are not the intended bene-
ficiaries." Id. at 1358 n.7.
97. Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp. 753, 755 (S.D.Ga. 1975) (emphasis added).
98. Sanchez v. Great W. Employment Agency, 456 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir. 1972).
99. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), Chief Justice Warren de,
termined that the resources of the Attorney General alone were not adequate to enforce
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1976); for the provisions of that
Act extended to actions by all the states and all their subdivisions. "The Attorney General
has a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new regulations and
enactments passed at the varying levels of state government." 393 U.S. at 556. In Miller v.
Mallery, 410 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Or. 1976),
the remedy sought by plaintiff's class is one which would test the legality of
actions by the very officials themselves who are charged with the duty of prevent-
ing harm to Bull Run water by 'trespassers.' But here those very officials have
authorized-indeed welcomed-the alleged 'trespass,' namely, commercial, large-
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quiry usually involves the autonomy and efficiency of the admin-
istering agency. Occasionally, there is evidence about enforcement
needs. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus in
J.1. Case v. Borak,1 ° argued that "[p]rivate enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission ac-
tion . . ." and "advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy state-
ments annually and each of them must necessarily be expedited."' 01
The Supreme Court allowed suits by individuals who had been or
would be injured by inadequate proxy statements. In a later case,
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission argued at length that it was essential to enforcement that
tender offerors be able to sue for damages for violations by the
opposing offeror. This time the majority of the Supreme Court
refused to allow such suits. 02 Justice Stevens in dissent agreed with
the Commission, noting that few individual shareholders would
have had the capacity to effectively litigate the case "through a
preliminary injunction, discovery, trial on liability, another trial
on damages, three appeals to the Second Circuit, including an en
banc, and two petitions to [the Supreme] Court."'1 3 The Depart-
ment of Labor as amicus provided evidence about enforcement of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act's prohibition against discharge
for one garnishment, and advocated allowing suit by individuals
so injured. That evidence persuaded one court to allow individual
suits, but three others refused. 0 4 More often judges have no evi-
dence about enforcement and simply assume either that no agency
scale, ongoing logging operations. And their legal advisor . . . is the one whose
duty is the prosecution of violations of criminal statutes, including the Bull Run
Trespass Act.
Id. at 1289. The court concluded that private actions are needed "where the alleged law
breaker is also the law enforcer." Id.
100. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
101. J.i. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Cases dealing with such suits
under the securities laws are collected in 2 Loss, SEcuarrIEs REGULATION 932-56 (1961);
5 Loss, SEcUrrrs REGULATION 2879-926 (Supp. 1969). See also Crane & Walker, Who Can
Sue and Be Sued Under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 32 Bus. LAW.
417 (1977).
102. The Court acknowledged in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), that
the SEC operates under the same constraints in enforcing the Williams Act that it did in
the context of J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), but concluded that "institutional
limits alone do not lead to the conclusion that any party interested in a tender offer
should have a cause of action for damages against a competing bidder." 430 U.S. at 41.
108. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 68 (1977).
104. The brief, filed in Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973), is described in Stewart v.
Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 113 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ever has enough resources to fully meet its task or that enforce-
ment is adequate unless shown to be otherwise. Judge King
assumed that "it is not enough for [the statute] to have some en-
forcement mechanisms; the initial question is whether the statute's
protection might be enhanced by allowing private civil relief."'10
For Judge Thornberry "a comprehensive enforcement scheme
• ..including substantial criminal penalties for violations of child
labor laws," but without provision for private suit, was enough.100
When judges discuss enforcement in terms of deterrence, the
value of private actions is likewise usually left to assumption. If
the judge assumes that actions by injured individuals will deter
others from causing injury, and thereby benefit the public, the
plaintiff will usually win. The Fifth Circuit allowed individual
damage actions for violations of the act which created and funded
the Federal Employment Service. "What more effective way will
there be to eradicate conditions so deplored? ...What better
way will there be to eliminate the problem of poor workers re-
sponding to 'Clearance Orders,' journeying hundreds of miles
across the country to accept work and the advantage of the benefits
promised by the laws of the United States only to find that the
promise is a fraud?"'07 If the judge asks for proof that the pos-
sibility of a damage award will deter statutory violations, the plain-
tiff will usually lose. Justice Burger took that position in Piper,
refusing to allow the losing tender offeror to sue the winner for
statutory violations: "Nor can we agree that an ever-present threat
of damages against a successful contestant in a battle for control
will provide significant additional protection for shareholders in
general. The deterrent value, if any, of such awards can never be
ascertained with precision."' 08 Once again, the placing of the
105. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1974). Judge Wisdom in
dissent in Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969
(1972), assumed that "the Labor Department (does not] have the manpower or the time
that complete enforcement of the law by it alone would require." 467 F.2d at 1396.
106. Breitvieser v. KMS Indus., 467 F.2d 1391, 1392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
969 (1972).
107. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969).
Likewise, in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 548 F.2d 452 (3rd Cir.), modified, 405 F. Supp. 442 (1976), the court assumed that
"[l]iability to private suit is or may be as potent a deterrent as liability to public prosecu-
tion."
108. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1977). Burger added that if share-
holder protection is enhanced at all by damage awards, the same result can be obtained by
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burden of persuasion about an uncertain phenomenon, this time
deterrence, determines outcome. But none of the judges explain
why they should choose to assume or doubt the deterrent effect of
individual actions, nor why they should so often allocate the
burden of proving its effectiveness to the claimant.10 9
When judges make the role of the state courts determinative
they are again deciding for "the public good." The courts in these
cases do that in two ways. First, the courts, in deciding whether to
allow damage claims based on federal statutes, express concern
about impinging on areas that are traditionally controlled by the
states. Regarding this concern, judges either assume that state law
provides the framework for decision into which federal law only
sometimes ventures, 10 or that, though some areas may traditionally
be the concern of the states, the passage of the federal statute on
"less drastic means more closely tailored to the precise congressional goal underlying the
Williams Act." Id. at 40.
109. H. PACKER, THm LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 252 (1968) states that "we
have no reason to think that [private suit] would have anything but the most oblique
and marginal effect on the objectionable conduct." Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of
Dr. Calabresi: Auto Compensation and General Deterronce. 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1967)
oppose an auto compensation plan that places the cost of accidents solely on motorists.
Their opposition largely grows out of "what we don't know" about general deterrence.
"To put the disagreement in a nutshell: when we know as little as we appear to know
about the prophecies of general deterrence, it is unjust to tax motorists on behalf of it."
Id. at 265. They suspect a small social gain would be achieved and intensive individual
burdens would be imposed.
The Supreme Court, in recent cases where damages are based on federal statutes, has
taken a strange view of the function of deterrence. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
the Court, in discussing deterrence, looked back to the event in question rather than
forward to future similar conduct, whether by that defendant or another.
[I]n this instance the remedy sought would not aid the primary congressional goal
[to assure that federal elections are 'free from the power of money.] . . . Recovery
of derivative damages by the corporation for violation of § 610 would not cure
the influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance may have had
on a federal election. Rather, such a remedy would only permit directors in effect
to 'borrow' corporate funds for a time; the later compelled repayment might well
not deter the initial violation, and would certainly not decrease the impact of the
use of such funds upon an election already past.
Id. at 84. F. ZIMRING & G. HAwKINs, DTRRENCE-THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
(1978) provide an extensive survey of what we do know, and in the last chapter set up
"An Agenda for Research in Deterrence." See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal
Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1972); Ehrlich & Gibbons, On the Measurement
of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 35 (1977); Ziesel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976
S. CT. REv. 317.
110. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at 84.).
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which the claim is based breaks the tradition.111 Nothing is said
about the choice between these assumptions. We know as little
about why one or the other is chosen as we know about the choice
to address these particular questions in the first place. Second, the
federal courts sometimes rely on the possible existence of state
remedies to remove the pressure for creating their own.12 This
alleviates their concern about the possible squandering of limited
federal court resources. But the availability of a state remedy is
often uncertain. When a case is resolved on this basis, the plain-
tiff chances that state law has developed and will be applied in a
way that will take into account his or her injury.
Finally, the separation of powers between the federal courts
and Congress is sometimes discussed and made determinative,
rather than simply left implicit in the usual search for a legislative
answer. In a recent and extended discussion in Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago,"13 Justice Powell in dissent observed that "Cort
allows the Judicial Branch to assume policy-making authority
vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch."4 . . . [It]
encourages, as a corollary to the political default by Congress, an
increase in the governmental power exercised by the federal
judiciary." 15 He was of the opinion that "the mode of analysis
we have applied in the recent past cannot be squared with the
doctrine of the separation of powers."116 The opinion for the
majority, which allowed private suit on Title IX,"1 was based on
the context in which that statute was passed. At that time, and
until 1972, Justice Stevens observed, "this Court had consistently
found implied remedies-often in cases much less clear than
111. Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435 (ED. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 548
F.2d 452 (3rd Cir.), modified, 405 F. Supp. 442 (1976). As to the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976), the court concluded:
It is true . . .that if the allegations of the complaint can be proved, plaintiffs
will be able to recover in state court under strict tort liability or negligence
theories, or for breach of warranty. However, aviation is not 'an area basically the
concern of the states' . . . and the Federal Aviation Agency provides the primary
regulatory scheme for maintaining safety in the industry.
405 F. Supp. at 441.
112. Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp. 753, 758 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
113. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
114. Id. at 743.
115. Id. at 743-44. A majority of the justices seem to share Justice Powell's dissatisfac-
tion with current doctrine.
116. Id. at 730.
117. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
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this.""" Whichever approach one prefers, the existence of these
different modes of treatment establishes the existence of an alterna-
tive to making separation of powers determinative, and makes it
clear that concern about separation of power can be and indeed has
been, overcome, freeing the courts to consider the needs of the
parties.
Even if the determinative questions are to be formulated iM
terms of the public, individual claims have a broader significance
than as deterring weapons, or as weights in the state-federal or
court-Congress balance. That significance is explored in the final
section of this paper.
C. Understanding Judicial Choice of Utilitarian Assumptions
That judicial decisions about statutory damages on federal
statutes should track legislative choice and attempt to maximize
social utility or public good, without much consideration of con-
sequences to the individual, should not be surprising for at least
two reasons. First, it allows the courts to avoid consistent doubts
about the legitimacy of judicial choice by returning attention to
the legislature. Second, it is consistent with the way judicial choices
are increasingly being made, and with a pervasive acceptance of
social efficiency as a goal.
The judiciary's effort to decide statutory damage claims on
the basis of public need, as defined by the legislature, helps to
avoid the perennial problem of the uncertain legitimacy of judicial
choice-a problem that is particularly acute when the judicial
choice is made in a statutory context. The process of producing a
statute requires that legislators make choices. They made the choice
in the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 19711 9 and in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967120 to provide
118. 441 U.S. at 698. Other justices also recognized the shift in treatment with Cort,
though Justice Powell denied it.
119. Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c) (1976). Mashaw, Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory
Provisions: The Citizens Suit, 4 CLAss Aar. REP. 29 (1975) describes federal legislation
containing citizen enforcement provisions and proposed legislation allowing such actions.
The statutes that provide such actions include: Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (h)-2
(1976); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976); Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. § 1415 (g) (1976); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. 1976). The
difficulties with such suits are set forth in Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environ-
mental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 EcoLoGY L.Q. 407 (1972).
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a civil action for legal or equitable relief to any person aggrieved
by violation of either statute. We need only know that such choices
were embodied in the statute and approved by a certain portion
of the members of the legislature to anticipate that under prevail-
ing assumptions the courts will accept them as legitimate choices,
formally binding on all of us. 12' This equation of election and
legitimate choice has been supported by a range of assumptions-
that representatives in making collective choices are in fact able
to discern a single good for a relatively homogeneous public,
1 22
or, as a bottom line, that artificial choices of the good are neces-
sary "[b]ecause there are no conceptions of the good that stand
above the conflict [of individual wills defining their own good]
and impose limits on Jt."' a Whether the equation is taken as fac-
tually true, or as justification for a necessarily artificial definition
of the good, it gives the choice embodied in statute as much legiti-
macy as can be had under current political theory.1 24 Even though
choices of the legislature may in fact be made for the benefit of
some-to the exclusion of others-they are formally taken to be for
us all.
The process of electing legislators validates their collective
choices. Since federal judges are not elected, their choices are not
accorded this formal assumption of legitimacy. Gordon Wood
describes a concept of agency representation of the people by the
courts in the late 1700's, but neither judges nor commentators
121. K. ARRow, supra note 1, at 1, describes voting as one of only two methods by
which social choices can be made. It is typically used to make "political" decisions, whercas
the market is used to make "economic decisions." Though one may argue that there are
other ways of making social choices, voting (and thereafter the votes of representatives) is
commonly taken to be one of them. However, E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEcIsLA-
nTON (1917) argues that the legislature must be principled for legitimacy and develops
standards to accomplish that goal.
122. D. BooRaSvsN, Tm GENIUs or AMERICAN POLITICS (1953) approached this posi-
tion. This view seems often to be implicit in law review writing.
123. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 68 (1975).
124. I state this in a way that tries to avoid what appears to be a futile debate about
how much more democratic, and therefore legitimate, the legislature is than the court.
See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and
Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810 (1974). Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1033, 1045 (1968) manages
to avoid treating the and-democratic nature of judicial action as "a problem" by noting
that "democracy in our tradition emphasizes citizen participation as much as it does
majority rule." By contrast, Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. Rav. 1669, 1688 (1975) views the ultimate problem in this area to be the
control and validation of "the exercise of essentially legislative powers by administrative
agencies that do not enjoy the formal legitimation of one-person one-vote election."
[Vol. 28
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have developed that as a source of legitimacy for judicial choice.12
Judges, neither elected nor omnipotent, do not find any settled
and singular values that dictate judicial choices; 126 normative
premises are chosen rather than somehow "given."2' The judiciary
must search further for legitimacy for its choices. The extent to
which commentators have undertaken that search indicates their
deep concernabout the legitimacy of judicial choice. 28
125. G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 605, 596-99 (1969) ("There-
fore all governmental officials, including even the executive and judicial parts of the
government, were agents of the people, not fundamentally different from the people's
nominal representatives in the lower houses of the legislatures." Id. at 598.) A move in
that direction can be seen in Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1952).
126. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TaIA 346 (1940) traces the historical origin of the natural
law concept and attempts to demonstrate "the unavoidability of considerable diversity in
the man made legal rules, no matter how much agreement there may be about basic
principles and their corollaries." Id. at 365.
127. "Thus by dropping formalism we (quite rightly) fell into the responsibility of
good and evil." Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REv. 451,454 (1974).
128. Justifications of judicial choice still largely go to formal structuring of the
judicial decision, drawing legitimacy from the process of decision. In the classical model
of judicial decision, the outcome of the particular case follows mechanically from the
application of a rule produced by a "substantively rational decision-making" process.
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (1973). See also Friedman, On Legalis-
tic Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 148. Formality is in the assump-
tion that some single rule will govern a particular situation, that the rule will dictate the
result when a judge applies it to a particular case and that judicial action is actually
mechanical. Ackerman, supra note 72, further describes this resort to process.
Abandoning in large measure its efforts to justify decisions by reference to a
substantive tradition rooted in a comprehensive vision of a good society, legal
scholarship concerned itself with the ways in which the structure of the existing
legal process of dispute resolution limited the extent to which each decision-
maker could properly impose his own particular social ideals upon the world
around him.
Id. at 123. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REv.
1 (1959) may be the best known of those who have described the proper structure of, and
appropriate process for, judicial decision. Writers who have worked at the implications of
reliance on process include: Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation De-
cision, 69 -ARv. L. Rav. 1 (1955); Clark & Trubeck, The Creative Role of the Judge:
Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 271 (1961);
Griswold, Foreward: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HAtv.
L. Rtv. 81, 88 (1961); Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAv. L. REv. 184 (1959);
Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In re Meaning, 29 FORDHAm L. REv. 553 (1961); Kuriand,
Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. Rsv. 629 (1970); Meuller & Schwartz,
The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 571 (1960); Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960); Wright,
Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HAitv. L. REv. 769
(1971).
Balancing is the process that permeates contemporary decisions. For an indication of
the prevalence of balancing-equilibrium theory in law and generally-and for criticism of
it, see Katz, supra note 9, especially at 25. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 542-643 describes
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When court and legislature are jointly involved in making a
set of decisions, assumptions about legislative legitimacy and
questions about judicial legitimacy become exaggerated. This has
most noticeably occurred with judicial review of the constitution-
ality of statutes. 29 It has likewise happened, as already described,
when a statute is the basis for jurisdiction, but leaves open the
question of damages. In those cases both courts and commentators
act as though the legislature has made a choice, and ask the sort of
questions about enforcement and public need that would be asked
in legislative session. This method of avoiding questions about
the legitimacy of judicial choice helps insure the continued domi-
nance of utilitarian assumptions in law.
In addition to avoiding problems of legitimacy, the choices
made by the courts in the statutory damage cases are not surprising
because they are consistent with the way judicial choices are in-
creasingly being made. It is, of course, difficult to generalize about
how "judicial choices are increasingly being made," for the excep-
tions come easily to mind. Still, a general emphasis on concerns
that transcend the parties seems to be apparent. In making pre-
cisely that point, writers tend to describe for contrast a time when
that was not so, when it was thought that the court's task was to
reliance on balancing in tort. Balancing is likewise prevalent in the narrower cut of tort
cases that I have discussed.
In Cort, the four factors to be considered in determining the existence of a cause of
action are presented without any indication of the relationship among them. Some courts
have explicitly proceeded to balance them; most have done so implicitly. In Miller v.
Mallery, 410 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D. Or. 1976), the court reasoned: "Three of the four
factors mentioned in Cort v. Ash militate in favor of the implication of a civil remedy
while only one-the legislative record-factor is essentially neutral .... [Tjherefore, a
remedy, consistent with the legislative purpose, should be, and is, granted and fashioned."
In Love v. Temple Univ., 866 F. Supp. 835, 841 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court found the
competing policies evenly balanced and determined that judicial restraint should be
exercised and the matter left to Congress. In balancing interests, the court can acknowledge
and accommodate complex and multifaceted problems-there is no need to identify a single
rule to govern. The formality of the conception is in the assumption that it is the
balance which determines the result when a judge uses it in a particular case, rather than
the selection and description of the values to be weighed.
129. While this concern with the process of decision has been most apparent in the
context of constitutional decisions, supra note 128, it has not been confined there. A
pluralist theory of legitimacy for the legislature, described as interest group liberalism by
T. Lows, supra note 74, at 71, and the same theory transferred to administrative agencies,
Stewart, supra note 124, at 1712, indicate the prevalence of process solutions. Clark &
Trubeck, supra note 128, capture the common criticism of process justifications: "[C]scape
from this hard task [of contemplating the consequences of an act] by reliance on neutrality
and certainty to avoid forthrightness is itself a decision, albeit one of negation." Id. at 271.
But, it is not a decision that is acknowledged.
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settle private issues between private parties. Samuel Thorne, in
his discussion of early English statutes, described the medieval
conception of the judge's task-"the simple administration of jus-
tice between party and party."'130 He also described the attendant
difficulties courts had in dealing with statutes from that perspec-
tive.13 1 Morton Horwitz suggests that 18th century judges "almost
never self-consciously employed the common law as a creative
social instrument for directing men's energies toward social
change."' 3 2 Abram Chayes draws on "our received tradition" and
"late nineteenth century vision of society" for the conception that
the lawsuit was "a vehicle for settling disputes between private
parties about private rights."'t1 A lawsuit so traditionally con-
ceived, he says, is bipolar, retrospective, self-contained, party-
initiated and party-controlled, and in it the right and remedy are
interdependent. 34 The contrast with the current trend to "public
law litigation" is probably not so clear as it is made to appear. 35
But my effort here is not to question the historical contrasts these
writers work from, but to confirm their sense that, by contrast,
modern courts are concerned with, and are easily--though not al-
ways-involved in the resolution of what they take to be public
issues. 130
180. Introduction to A DiscotmsE UPON THE ExpOSICION AND UNDERSTANDING OF
STATUTES 3, 22 (S. Thorne ed. 1942).
131. ld. at 54.
132. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
1780-1820, in LAw IN AmERicAN HIsTORY 287 (D. Fleming g B. Bailyn eds. 1971). It is
not always clear whether Horwitz means that judges never explained their choices as ones
to accomplish social change, or that they never attempted to affect social change. Surely,
judges did increasingly take a part in attempting to affect social change, but the contrast
before and after 1820 seems too stark unless Horwitz means only to chronicle a change in
reasons given.
133. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAnv. L. REV. 1281-
83 (1977).
134. Id. at 1282-83.
135. Id. at 1283. Chayes admits that his capsule description "is no doubt overdrawn"
as a description of reality, but notes his belief that it nonetheless "has been central to
our understanding and our analysis of the legal system." Id.
186. The assumption that courts confine themselves to the provision of justice for
individuals lingers, but it is seldom enunciated. Judge Bergan in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 809 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1970), provides a rare state-
ment of the position:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties before
it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public issues.
Large questions of law are often resolved by the manner in which private litiga-
tion is decided. But this is normally an incident to the court's main function to
settle controversy. It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private
1979]
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I increasingly see the concern with public issues in common
law tort-the analogue of damage claims in federal court based on
federal statute. Leon Green, early on, taught that decisions in tort
cases are made with the understanding that other parties will
appear before the court on the same issues, that the desires and
practices of other people are molded into a decision, that tort law
is public law in disguise. 3 7 Certainly, that has been explicit in the
formulation of negligence, where personal action is measured by
social utility. Walter Blum and Harry Kalven continued to de-
scribe tort law as "private law,' 138 despite Green's teaching, but
they did so in a different context. While Green was describing tort
as a distinct entity, Blum and Kalven were talking about it in
contrast to "insurance funds and compensation plans [where] the
matter becomes alchemized into public law.''a89
From being acknowledged to be "public law in disguise," tort
law seems increasingly to be emerging simply as "public law."
That has occurred despite efforts such as Robert Keeton's to ex-
plain the imposition of liability for non-negligent, risky conduct
as simply a variation in the meaning of fault and not "the substitu-
tion of social responsibility for individual responsibility.' 140 In-
litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly
beyond the rights and interests of the court.
Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314. This view is reflected in recent efforts
to place the teaching of administrative law in a larger and more realistic context. Mashaw
and Merrill claim "the public law system" as their domain for that purpose. J. MASHAW
& R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW Sysmm: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1975). Their division between public and private is largely a division by institution.
Mashaw and Merrill define "the public law system" as "the legal structure within which
the primary actors-legislators and administrators, formulate and apply policy-the institu-
tional structure that defines the legal relationship of citizens with their government."
Id. at xix. Private law, on the other hand, is "the law governing the rights and duties
of individuals in their relations with one another" and "has been the product largely of
judicial decision, developed and articulated through the analogical application of princi-
ples embodied in prior cases." Id. at 935. Although the authors acknowledge that "the
public law system ... shares important points of connection, reenforcement and tension
with the private law system," id. at xx, they are not involved in an enterprise that forces
them to reconsider their basic division.
137. Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1959), reprinted in
L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 115 (1965).
138. W. BLUM & H. KALvEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM
3 (1964). In their first footnote, the authors note that Green appeared to have used
"public law" in a somewhat different sense than they use it.
129. Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and Gen.
eral Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 239, 265 (1967).
140. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1959).
He explained: "[r]ather, concepts of individual responsibility, with moral content, remain
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creasingly, concern transcends the individuals involved. Individual
interests are absorbed into a calculus which assumes that some in-
dividuals may be excluded from receiving certain benefits in order
to achieve maximum social utility. That is built into the economic
analysis being used to determine the cost of accidents, and is
acknowledged by economists. 41 Guido Calabresi suggests "that
justice is a totally different order of goal from accident cost reduc-
tion,"'42 and Richard Posner describes the accident itself as a dosed
chapter in the enterprise of preventing future accidents, and thus
reducing accident costs. "The issue becomes what is a just and fair
result for a class of actions."'4' Such analysis has been finding its
way from the journals into court opinions.144
George Fletcher, writing of fairness and utility in tort theory,
summarizes the pervasiveness of current concern for the public
that transcends concern for the individual in his "paradigm of
reasonableness." That paradigm, which he sees as currently domi-
nant, "provides the medium for tying the determination of liability
to maximization of social utility . . ."' As he puts it, "[t]he
fashionable concerns of the time are instrumentalist."'146 Dissatisfied
with this system, Fletcher describes and advocates a contrasting
paradigm of reciprocity that assesses liability on the basis of the
relative risks created by the parties. Yet, at the same time that
Fletcher criticizes the current view, he illustrates the strength of
its hold on us. He acknowledges a deep political clash between the
paradigms he describes; between choices made by comparing the
risks undertaken by the parties, and choices based on the useful-
ness of plaintiff's activity to society. "The question posed by the
vital to an understanding of tort decisions and trends. Such concepts underlie liability of
non-negligent risky conduct as wol as liability in the more familiar areas of negligence
and intentional torts." Id. at 444.
141. L. ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 177 (1952) ("A theory of economic policy, in the sense of a body of precepts
for action, must take its ultimate criterion from outside economics.")
142. G. CALABRESI, THE Cosr OF AccmiDENs 25 (1970).
143. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7.
144. E.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
145. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 557.
146. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 538. Epstein is also dissatisfied with the nature of
the current question. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 151
(1973), which undertakes "to develop a normative theory of torts that takes into account
common sense notions of individual responsibility." R. RABIN, PERPVEnVS ON TORT LAW
212 (1976), sees these two writings as "almost certainly an expression of the pervasive




conflict of paradigms was whether traditional notions of individual
autonomy would survive increasing concern for the public welfare.
If the courts of the time had clearly perceived and stated the issue,
they would have been shaken by its proportions. '147 Having recog-
nized the intensity of the conflict, Fletcher nonetheless does not
go far beyond asserting the importance of the concerns of the non-
utilitarian paradigm of reciprocity. He mentions the importance
of the "autonomy of the individual" and incorporates by reference
the argument in criminal law against the sacrifice of individual
interests.148 He asserts that surely there are some situations in which
society cannot ask the individual to sacrifice his interest in dam-
ages.149 Having reached the point where one wants to know why
that cannot be asked, Fletcher shifts to a discussion of the "inter-
play of substance and style," suggesting that the appeal of the
paradigm of reasonableness "might well be more one of style than
of substance;" the questions of reasonableness and utility lend
themselves to precise, multistep calculations, and balances that
appear rational and scientific. The alternate paradigm of re-
ciprocity requires, he says, the use of metaphors and images-
"a way of thinking that hardly commends itself as precise and
scientific."' 150 While provocative, an explanation based on style is
unsatisfying when the underlying conflict is as fundamental as he
suggests. One hesitates to complain, for few writers have even
acknowledged these questions, much less attempted the answers.'
Nonetheless, that task remains.
Preoccupation with public needs in law is consistent with
the theory dominant outside law. Utilitarian choices for the great-
est good do not involve defining a minimum share for each of
society's members.'52 That current choices in one area of law will
147. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 566.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 568.
150. Id. at 571-72.
151. Leff, supra note 127, at 482, thinks "we shall have to continue wrestling with a
universe filled with too many things about which we understand too little and then
evaluate them against standards we don't even have."
152. Michelman describes, though he does not rely on, this sort of reasoning:
[Realities] impel us to believe that, even though particular measures cannot be
shorn of capriciously redistributive consequences, we can arrive somehow at an
acceptable level of assurance that over the life of a society (and within the ex-
pectable lives of any of its members) burdens and benefits will cancel out leaving
something over for everyone, and that society ought, therefore, to proceed to
[Vol. 28
DAMAGES AND FEDERAL STATUTES
tend to be largely consistent with others in law, and with predomi-
nant social theory outside law, is hardly surprising and is useful
in understanding judicial choices in a particular area. It is an ob-
servation about similarity and leaves open the question of how
change in basis for choice in law might come about.
II. ANOTHER BAsis
I began by suggesting the pervasiveness of utilitarian assump-
tions and argued that such pervasiveness had a circular effect which
made it extremely difficult to escape those assumptions. That is, to
criticize current utilitarian assumptions in legal choice, and to build
alternatives, we need concepts, language, and questions that do not
build in the assumptions of the current model. But it is that very
model which forms the language and concepts that are available,
and distinguishes the important questions from the trivial ones.
Judicial choice in the cases just detailed confirms the pervasiveness
of that model. There is one debate in one set of terms: is it in the
public interest to allow individual claims for damages? The debate
is about societal needs and it effectively absorbs any separate ques-
tion about the persons involved in the case.
In trying to begin to break that circle, I want to communicate
with those who continue to operate within it and to provide room
in which to build alternatives. I attempt this by defining a basis
for judicial choice that is the opposite of current assumptions, and
describing the relation between these extremes. Where public and
individual interests are now defined in terms of maximum public
good, the other extreme is to define both public and individual
interests in terms of the individual interests.
Inclusive or direct treatment of parties is the extreme: a court,
in making its choices, would decide the consequences of its decision
for communities that realistically include the parties before the
court. It is critical to this approach that although the court's atten-
tion would be extended beyond the parties, it would still include
the parties. This would avoid totally individualized, nongeneraliz-
able decisions as well as decisions based only on perceptions of the
economize its resources, using governmental coercion where necessary and not
agonizing too much over compensation.
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just
Compensation' Law, 80 Hv. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1967).
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public good. Flores and the other slaughterhouse workers on strike
with him sought damages from the George Braun Slaughterhouse
because it had used illegal aliens to break their strike. The judge,
in treating the parties directly, would decide whether to allow a
claim for damages by looking at the needs of the community of
striking workers and the needs of the community of employers. The
judge would not look to the needs of the agency responsible for
detecting and returning illegal aliens, nor would his concern be
with the manpower needs of employers who require workers in
numbers not locally available.
The strength of direct treatment is its capacity to communi-
cate the value on which the decision is based to the appropriate
communities. 153 Because they were directly included in the deci-
sion, it need not remain an abstraction for them. The weakness in
this potential is that community can be defined at varying levels of
generality, and the level of generality will determine the reality of
saying that the parties to the particular case have remained a part
of the court's concern. If the Flores claim for damages was evalu-
ated in terms of a very broadly defined community of "those af-
fected economically by the presence of working aliens," the striking
employees would be grouped with sellers of services to aliens, em-
ployers who rely on aliens to supplement a numerically inadequate
supply of labor, and even employers who rely on them to avoid
unionization. The outcome of that analysis might favor plaintiffs,
but that result would be coincidental, and unlikely to communicate
other than a general dedication to economic stability.
Once a judge identifies the relevant communities to be consid-
ered, he or she must determine whether there is any difference be-
tween the opposed communities that will warrant imposing legal
consequences on one or the other. That is, can Stewart and the
community of workers who may suffer economically from the loss
of their jobs after a single garnishment of wages, be distinguished
from employers who may suffer economically from having to con-
tinue to employ those workers having difficulty managing their
own resources? The legislative policy that employees should be
153. Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, I J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1972), applies
communication theory to judicial opinions, suggesting that "it should be possible . . . to
treat the phenomenon of stare decisis as a problem in human communications rather than
as exclusively one of logic and/or obfuscation." Id. at 134.
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secure from discharge for one garnishment could provide the basis
for distinguishing the two, for it undercuts the assumption that one
garnishment means an employee is unable to manage his own re-
sources, and it reinforces the value placed on stable employment.
If the communities cannot be distinguished by the value on which
the statute is based, the loss would either be left where it had
landed, or shifted on some other basis. If there are inconsistent
statutory messages, or if the statute's protection of the interests of
one party is ambiguous or incidental, it may provide no basis for
distinguishing the two.
To understand this alternative it may help to return again to
its opposite-to courts that treat the parties vicariously by making
decisions in the public interest. By treating parties vicariously, a
court adopts the utilitarian assumptions predominant in our ra-
tional bureaucratic society-that efficiency is the primary value,
that the decision whether to allow a party to seek damages can be
based on a calculation of consequences unrelated to the particular
party, because that method best assures the greatest benefit in the
long run. Farmland Industries sued Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas
Company for $33,824 for abandoning its service without the per-
mission of the Federal Power Commission. If the suit had occurred
during a national crisis over the allocation of energy, Judge Bright
might have concluded that the public would be best served if all
remedies and penalties against natural gas companies were con-
trolled by the Commission.
The strength of vicarious treatment is its potential to produce
an efficient society. Although all persons theoretically benefit from
vicarious treatment by obtaining the chance to live in an efficient
society, the equality is only theoretical. The same benefit is given
equally to persons who have either suffered or face very real in-
juries and those who have neither suffered nor risk injury. A
vicarious decision that private suits should not be allowed because
they would interfere with Federal Power Commission decision-
making would apply equally to Farmland and to natural gas users
in areas with multiple suppliers who would not suffer nor even
risk suffering Farmland's injuries.
The choice for courts between direct and vicarious treatment
of parties is a real one. It would evaporate if the interests of indi-
viduals and the public coincide, and some authors assume that
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consistency.154 But our knowledge about the uniformity of those
interests is so limited that at best we can focus on only one and
must leave the other to an assumed, but uncertain, connection. If
the greater value is placed on producing a decision comprehensible
to the parties, and capable of communicating to a community of
which the party is a member, then parties will be treated directly
and the "public interest" will be left to an assumed connection. If
the court's primary concern is to protect and further what it sees
as the public interest, then it will assume that the parties and their
communities will benefit by a decision in the public interest. This
uncertainty is part of normal working conditions for courts when
they select the basis for a decision. 5, The temptation seems to be
constant to find certainty where it does not exist rather than to
accept the existence of uncertainty and choose how to act in the
face of it.' When the interests of person, community or public
154.- Hurst's frequent use of the general "we," and his level of general discussion
seem to assume this consistency. E.g., J. HuRsr, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS Or FUEDoM IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) ("[P]eople in the nineteenth century
United States had already sighted the promise of a steeply rising curve of material pro-
ductivity as the dynamic of a new kind of society." Id. at 6. "All had in common a deep
faith in the social benefits to flow from a rapid increase in productivity; all shared an
impatience to get on with the job by whatever means seemed functionally adapted to it,
including the law." Id. at 70. "Law thus ratified values early and deeply instilled the be-
havior of the people ...." Id. at 130.) Tushnet, Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972
Wis. L. REv. 114, 115, refers to "social and historical theories which assume that societies
are united by a set of values widely shared among the population," and adds that "Hurst's
explanation of the development of the law begins by assuming just that sort of consensus.
Still, the complexity of the picture Hurst draws diminishes any impression of simple con-
sensus or a simple society and, as Tushnet notes, there is much we can learn from it before
going to work at "the legal process as the expression of social conflict." Id.
155. B. Canozo, THE NATuaR OF THE JunicIAL PRocEss (1921), reported this in
dramatic terms:
As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature
of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I
have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its
highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings,
the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the
pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new
principles are born.
Id. at 166-67. Clark & Trubeck, supra note 128, at 271, observe that "a natural consequence
of stress on certainty is to put a premium on judicial conservatism."
156. A common technique for avoiding uncertainty is the balancing of societal, com-
munity and personal needs to obtain a value free result. That choice of technique seems
regularly to result in a choice for the "public," for the interests of the public tend to
be described very generally to fully encompass it. By contrast, "individual interests" in
such a balance are usually made to coincide with the particular party before the court.
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755 (1963) cured this predetermined outcome of balancing by
suggesting that courts work on the assumption that "the individuals of the society, in
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are thought to conflict, courts are forced to make a choice without
the comfort of even an assumed connection.
157
III. DIPECT TREATMENT OF DAMAGE CLAIMANTS
The preceding sections have shown the federal courts in a set
of tort cases choosing between direct and vicarious treatment of the
parties before them. The choice cannot be avoided: (1) The judi-
cial determination is final for the parties when damages are sought,
even if the choice is made about the existence of a cause of action.
(2) The legislature has not made the choice. At most it has left
pieces that can support a judicial decision to allow or to deny dam-
ages and the question the court asks determines the answer it gets.
(3) The common judicial focus on public concerns and the vicar-
ious treatment it produces is a choice, not a given. It is both pos-
sible and important for the courts to choose to attend directly to
damage claimants.
A. The Values Furthered by Direct Treatment
Changing the basis for choice in law requires having available
alternatives derived from a range of concepts and ideas-a "market
place of ideas" in which challenge and debate strengthen the end
chosen. 58 Currently, there are developed concepts about public
being accorded liberties of speech, association and conscience, are in fact accorded a certain
[societal] role to play." Id. at 768. But in so doing he moved the entire debate to a public
level, setting aside considerations of person. The choice to balance, rather than avoiding
choice among interests of person, community and public, will usually constitute a choice
to decide the public issue and to leave the parties to vicarious treatment.
The same point is made in R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 328--29 (1959): "If the one
[claim] is thought of as a right and the other as a policy, or if the one is thought of as
an individual interest and the other as a social interest, our way of stating the question
may leave nothing to decide."
157. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 569-70, suggests that the interests of persons and of
the public are often inconsistent: "The major divergence is the set of cases in which a
socially useful activity imposes nonreciprocal risks on those around it. These are the cases
of motoring, airplane overflights, air pollution, oil spillage, sonic booms-in short, the re-
current threats of modem life." (footnote omitted). Fletcher maintains his opposition
throughout the article: "The conflict is whether judges should look solely at the claims
and interests of the parties before the court, or resolve seemingly private disputes in a
way that serves the interests of the community as a whole." Id. at 540. "The courts face
the choice. Should they surrender the individual to the demands of maximizing utility?
Or should they continue to protect individual interest in the face of community needs?"
Id. at 573. Fletcher is not alone in acknowledging that public interests and the interests
of particular persons are likely to conflict.
158. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
W. MENDELSON, JusTicEs BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT 52 (2d ed. 1966).
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needs, but not about the legal system's response to persons. The
courts only erratically consider and articulate the desires and de-
mands of individuals. It is important for at least three reasons that
the courts instead provide direct attention to individuals. First, the
courts are well situated for the task. By their limitation to cases and
controversies, courts have before them always "the piece," a part
of a broader social problem. Neither class actions nor multi-district
combinations of litigation overcome the fact that it is not the whole
problem, seldom even a substantial portion of it, that is before a
court. Nor have the courts the investigative capacity to study such
questions fully. The familiar limiting argument that grows out of
this observation about capacity of courts is that judges should re-
strain themselves from becoming involved in broad questions
which they do not have the means to explore.'" I reach the same
conclusion but for an affirmative reason-courts are the legal insti-
tution best situated to keep alive thinking about response to per-
sons. Thereby they can provide a distinctive part of the full range
of concerns out of which theories of social choice might be built.
Second, the desires and demands of individuals need to be raised
and worked out institutionally. A systematic means needs to be
available by which persons can force these issues. Some writers have
suggested alternatives to current assumptions, but their work has
remained outside the daily use of lawyers and courts, and thereby
outside most legal commentary. The isolation of such work will
likely continue unless alternatives to current assumptions become
a standard part of our consciousness, expressed in familiar terms.
Courts are in a position to accomplish this. Third, although a con-
tinuum of public to person hardly exhausts the ways one might
think about alternative bases for choice, its development adds to
the tools available for building other alternatives. Every additional
alternative should help raise consciousness that very fundamental
choices are being made in every legal decision, whether or not on
the surface.
B, The Individual's Claim to Judicial Solicitude
A party's claim to judicial attention need not succeed or fail
on the preceding arguments. It rests independently on the finality
159. See H. HART & A. SAcKS, supra note 59.
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of judicial choice for the party, the certain role of damages for the
parties and their uncertain relation to the public, and the relative
inability of claimants to get the court's choice reviewed.
First, a plaintiff seeking damages who does not, or may not,
have any other forum in which to seek'damages has a particularly
compelling claim, stronger than a plaintiff seeking injunctive re-
lief. This idea does not appear in the cases or commentary,1 60 in
part because of the tendency to focus on the existence of a cause of
action. The existence of a cause of action based on a statute does
not vary by the remedy sought. A denial of a cause of action equally
precludes injunctive relief and damages. The failure to distinguish
among remedies may also be due to the absence of much of a juris-
prudence of remedies. 61 We are not used to thinking in those cate-
gories; rather, questions of remedy are fragmented. They are
treated as the last issue in a particular body of substantive law, or
simply neglected. 62
160. For example, in Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La.
1970), the court draws the parallel between the Hill-Burton Act and the Wagner-Peyser
Act, but never notes that an injunction is sought on Hill-Burton and damages under
Wagner-Peyser.
In two instances the courts seemed to prefer injunctive relief to damages. In Poirrier
v. St. James Parish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1976), the court noted that the decision to deny a private action for damages
in StanturIf "is not necessarily inconsistent with these later holdings permitting private
suits asking injunctive relief to enforce the assurance [of services to indigents.]" The court
in Farmland Indus. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 678 (D. Neb.
1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973), suggests that "[e]quitable remedies may be in-
ferred more readily than damage remedies."
161. There is a covering maxim for questions of remedy: ubi jus, ibi remedium, "for
every right there is a remedy." It is an impressive generalization that has been embodied
in the constitutions of some states. See Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a Certain
Remedy, 49 IoWA L. Rxv. 1202 (1964). But it has no independent life-it nicely provides
emphasis for choices made but it does not break the circular process of defining rights
and remedies. Wright, supra note 46, at 376, confirms the absence of a jurisprudence of
remedies. "Much can be said about the law of remedies as a social institution. The most
important thing to say is that there is no law of remedies . . . there is no place where we
can find the whole subject put in perspective, with the many specific remedies dealt with
in theory." H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) views this gap from
another perspective:
The fact is that we do not have a systematic body of theory about the kinds of
sanctions available to reinforce the primary norms of conduct that the law seeks
to promote, or about their distinguishing characteristics, their strengths and weak-
nesses, the anticipated benefits from their use, and the social costs that their invo-
cation incurs.
Id. at 251.
162. This is reflected in miniature in most of the casebooks prepared for the teach-
ing of "remedies," a course that would seem by its title to seek learning common to various
substantive areas. After at most a scanning of the general principles of equity, the division
is by "interests in property," "personal interests," and "business interets." R. CramDREs &
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Second, although the amount of a damage award is always
problematic, it has real significance for the injured party. It would
pay medical expenses and the cost of rehabilitation for Doak and
Stanturf. It might support Flores and other former slaughterhouse
workers after their unemployment benefits ended. It would pay
Farmland Industries' $33,824 oil bill. Damages are equally signifi-
cant for the party who has to pay them. Maintenance, Inc. would
lose much of the profit on its contract to supply janitorial services.
Traveler's Insurance would have to pay an additional wage. By
contrast, we usually know little about the effect that allowing dam-
ages has on the public. We do not know whether they aid or hin-
der agency enforcement, though guesses are often made. The
agency affected only occasionally provides information to aid in
this assessment. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as ami-
cus, described at length why private damage actions were necessary
to insure enforcement of the tender offer disclosure provisions of
the Williams Act.0 3 We know even less about whether the specter
of damages deters violation of statutes.0 4
Third, direct treatment of parties should more often leave the
burden of getting the court's choice changed on the party with the
capacity to accomplish that change. 105 Whether a court allows or
denies a statutory damage claim, Congress is free to change the rule
by amending the statute. Institutions such as gas companies, hos-
pitals, newspapers and insurance companies are more likely to be
in a position to change the result of a court's decision by resort to
Congress than are their employees or customers. 0
IV. JOHNSON, ]EQUITY, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES, THE STUDY OF LITIGATION THEORY (1974).
K. YORK & J. BAUMAN, REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS (1978) provide somewhat more in-
troduction to equitable remedies, then move through remedies for injuries to tangible
property interests and then to intangible business and relational interests. The authors
then proceed to actions for defamation and business disparagement, for injuries to inter.
ests of personalty, and others. 0. FIss, INJUNCTIONS (1972) and K. PARKEn, MODERN
JUDICIAL REzMFDmS (1975) organize first by remedy (with Fiss limiting his concern to
injunctions) rather than by substantive area.
163. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 64 (1977).
164. Deterrence from criminal sanctions has at least been studied and we still know
rather little about it. See generally note 109 supra.
165. Direct treatment of parties will more often, but not always, result in recovery
for the claimant. See text accompanying notes 172-187 infra.
166. Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1068 (1966).
Macaulay further suggests, as to direction of error, that when we lack data about
the likely consequences of proposals and the actual consequences of legal ac-
tion . . . we have to consider the risks of shooting in the dark. Sometimes this is
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C. Legitimacy for Judicial Decisions
No source of legitimacy for judicial choice has been found
beyond the stability of incremental and rulebound decisions in
common law contexts, and the neutrality and generality of judicial
process for choices involving legislation.167 The generality and
neutrality of process required for this judicial claim to legitimacy
fails in two ways. First, it does not address the hard questions of
substantive choice.'68 Second, it tends to merge the judicial func-
tion into the legislative one, as courts imitate legislatures in mak-
ing their choices for the public good.
In undertaking to provide direct treatment to parties, courts
could provide information for legislative choice by articulating the
existence and needs of persons injured by activity in violation of
statute. If there were numerous damage suits based on violations of
the Farm Labor Contractor Act, that evidence would be available
to proponents of more stringent enforcement tools, of more appro-
priations for enforcement and of an explicit statutory right to sue.
If damage claims for the termination of natural gas service turned
out to interfere with the regulatory planning of the Federal Power
Commission, the Commission would have that experience avail-
able in attempting to persuade Congress to preclude private suits.
In providing direct treatment of parties, courts would reinforce
the only sensible course open; often it is not. If it must be done, the risk can be
minimized by adopting approaches that particularize rather than approaches that
work like a shotgun.
Id. at 1121.
167. See note 128 supya.
168. Consider the possible rules suggested by the alternative ways of relating value
and damages to the person injured: "plaintiff can recover damages for injury from viola-
tion of statute only if that award furthers the public interest," or "plaintiff can recover
damages for injury from violation of statute if there is a community of interest to which
the statutory value will be communicated, and the value embodied in statute distinguishes
plaintiff from defendant in a way that makes it fair to impose the burden of damages on
defendant." Either rule could be chosen so long as the process of choice "transcended any
immediate result." Each rule could be defended if the choice could be traced as gradually
emerging, being worked out in a series of cases. But neither explanation tells us how to
choose whether the person, community or public should have the benefit of focused
judidal attention-whether the person, community or public should bear the burden of
the uncertain connections among them. The judicially created rule that "plaintiff cannot
recover damages unless defendant failed to act as a reasonable man," and a judicially
created rule that "plaintiff can recover damages if defendant imposed a non-reciprocal
risk on plaintiff," equally "transcend any immediate result that is involved." Each has
been gradually and carefully filled out in the cases in which it is applied. Having con-
cluded that, we still do not know how to choose between them. It is not surprising that
process solutions are no help in making substantive choices about how courts will exercise
their power: they are solutions created to avoid questions of substance.
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legislative choice by communicating legislative values to parties. 10
That communication seems preferable to the dissonance created
when a legislature says "it is important that employees not suffer
retaliation for helping implement Fair Labor Standards Act re-
quirements," and a court says "but not for you" to employees
claiming damages from retaliation.170
The judicial claim to legitimacy on this basis would be built
on participation, on interaction between court and legislature. 71
The importance of that interaction is reinforced by the uncertain
relation between person and public. This view would take judicial
activity in a statutory context as a "good," rather than as an intru-
sion.
D. Different Questions and Decisions
The choice to treat parties directly would produce different
questions from those currently asked and often different outcomes.
On Doak's claim, the court would inquire whether Congress in the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act might have valued the safety of
gas workers, and whether that value distinguishes between em-
ployees working with piped natural gas and the companies trans-
porting such gas. Damages could communicate the statutory value
to employers, and to employees who might organize around it. The
court would have to determine whether the statute precludes dam-
169. Shapiro, supra note 153, bases his theory of stare decisis on communication
theory. The extent of communication in the situations I have described would vary
enormously. Communication might be facilitated within a community-by union and
trade association newsletters, by press reports of damage awards, by lawyers who specialize
in particular areas of litigation, by shareholders, by business and social meetings and by
organizations of indigents.
170. As a result of that message the individual may become insignificant in his own
eyes-a result which Madison saw as "the really great danger to liberty in the extended
republic of America." Madison's concerns are recounted and set in political context in
G. WooD, supra note 5, at 612.
There are varying estimates of the importance of consistency in individual experience,
and these are largely gathered in THEoRs OF COGNITIVE CONSISTNCY (R. Abelson ed.
1968). Jonathan Freedman questions whether human beings fit "consistency models [of]
a very cognitive man who is extremely concerned about and devotes a great deal of
energy to maximizing cognitive consistency." Id. at 498. He suggests rather that "when
they do notice inconsistencies, people seem to endure them without being particularly
troubled." Id. at 502.
171. I have found that sort of interaction occurring between court and legislature
in New York State during the period 1870-1920, after the courts declared statutes uncon-
stitutional under open-ended provisions. J. Lindgren, Judicial Choice in New York, 1870-
1920 (unpublished Ins. 1978).
[Vol. 28
DAMAGES AND FEDERAL STATUTES
ages when it provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect
the common law or statutory tort liability of any person. "172 That
decision would reflect how important the court considered indi-
vidual claims and how careful it would require Congress to be in
precluding them.
On Stanturf's claim, the court would inquire whether Con-
gress in the Hill-Burton Act might have valued the health of indi-
gents, and whether that value distinguishes between the indigents
denied services and hospitals constructed with federal funds. Dam-
ages could communicate the statutory value to the hospitals, which
might comply or begin to seek exceptions under the Act, and to
indigents, who might organize around that issue to force hospitals
to comply with the statute. The court would not, as it did, deny
the claim for lack of jurisdiction."'
On the claim by the parents of Roger Breitweiser, the court
would inquire whether Congress in the Child Labor provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act might have valued the physical safety
of children, and whether that value distinguishes between children
operating such equipment and their employers. 74 It might not dis-
tinguish the two if Roger Breitweiser had been operating the fork-
lift in violation of KMS ordersY.'5 Damages could communicate the
statutory value to employers and to child laborers. The court would
not consider the case resolved by the observation that "Congress'
determination that sixteen year olds shall not be assigned to fork-
172. 49 U.S.C. § 1677 (b) (1976). The court in Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp.
753 (S.D, Ga. 1975) refused to allow an action for damages.
173. Most actions based on the Hill-Burton Act have been for an injunction requir-
ing the hospital to provide services to indigents. The courts split when that is the remedy
sought, sometimes resorting to primary jurisdiction in the agency. The court in Stanturf
refused an action for damages, but the theory of the case was not squarely set on an
action implied from the Hill-Burton Act.
174. Even if a court found that Congress had adopted this value, it might still deny
Diana Powell damages because she did not in fact contact the Department of Labor before
she was fired, but only threatened to do so. Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651,
652 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959). By contrast, Martinez had filed a com-
plaint in 1969 which resulted in a payment of $445.22 for back wages. Another complaint
was filed for a similar amount in 1970. Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv., 501 F.2d 104,
105 (5th Cir. 1974).
175. This issue is important in cases under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1971, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), when the employer is cited for failure to provide a
safe workplace and claims that the danger was produced by the failure of employees to
use safety equipment or to comply with safety rules. See, e.g., Brennan v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 502 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1974); National Realty and




lifts will not be subverted if we fail to read a civil damages remedy
into the act," 176 or by the fact that "we can find no indication that
Congress intended the FLSA which was passed to deter oppressive
child labor and contains substantial enforcement provisions, to
form the basis for an expansion of state wrongful death liability."117
On the claim by Flores, the court would inquire whether
Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act might have
valued the security of American citizens' jobs against the knowing
and willful hiring of illegal aliens, and whether that value distin-
guishes between citizen and employees and their employers. Dam-
ages could communicate the statutory value to the hiring industries,
and the employees whose efforts to force the Immigration Service
to end such hiring would be encouraged. The court would not
refuse to allow a claim for damages simply because "Congress has
revealed no intention to [create a private right of action and a
private remedy] under the immigration laws."'1 78
On Stewart's claim the court would inquire whether Congress
in the anti-garnishment provisions of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act might have valued jobs secure from one garnishment,
and whether that value distinguishes between the garnishees and
their employers. Damages could communicate the statutory value
to employers and to employees trying to hold jobs under circum-
stances where they are vulnerable. The court in Stewart accepted
this reasoning despite Traveler's assertion that "there is ample evi-
dence of a clear congressional intent against private actions for
civil remedies . . . and further that the criminal sanctions and
agency enforcement explicitly authorized . . . adequately protect
176. Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., 467 F.2d 1391, 1393 (5th Cir. 1972).
177. Id. at 1394. Cases that concur with the decisions in Powell and Martinez that a
private cause of action is not available when damages are sought include Bonner v.
Elizabeth Arden, 177 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1949), and Britton v. Grace Line, Inc., 214 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The court in Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 413 (E.D. La.
1969), in allowing suit by the person retaliated against, concluded that "[a] private suit
simply to collect damages for a past violation would not interfere with the Department of
Labor's enforcement efforts under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] nor would it present
questions requiring administrative expertise that could not be decided by a court of law."
Judge Harper in Boll v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 365 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D.
Mo. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1974), found the opinion in Fagot persuasive, but
concluded that the plaintiff in Boll was not discharged in retaliation for complaints about
wages and hours. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 610 (1964).
178. Flores v. George Braun Packing Co., 482 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1973); Chavez v.
Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir. 1972); accord, Lopez v. Arrowhead
Ranches, 523 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975); Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217, 100 Cal,
Rptr. 57 (1972).
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Stewart's statutory interest."' uo Three other courts found those
arguments persuasive.180
On Farmland Industries' claim, the court would inquire
whether Congress in requiring the permission of the Federal Power
Commission before terminating a customer's service, might have
valued the ability of consumers of regulated services to rely on
continued service, and whether that value distinguishes between
consumers and their suppliers. Damages could communicate the
statutory value to sellers of regulated natural gas, and to buyers,
who might be encouraged to resist when threatened with the ter-
mination of their gas services. The court would treat the Natural
Gas Act as straightforward in its prohibition and find that "[w]here
there exists a federal right, there must be a concurrent remedy."""
It would not need to make the case turn on the fact that "[a]ward-
ing of damages for loss [not an increase in rates] arising from the
unauthorized abandonment cannot be made, apparently, in any
forum except the federal court."'
' s2
On Royal Maintenance's claim, the court would inquire
whether Congress in providing for the "set-aside contracts" for
small businesses might have valued the viability of small businesses.
While it seems clear enough that this was the case, the valuing of
small business is so conditioned by exceptions in the Act that a
court might find that the value never survives the situation in
which a plaintiff might be injured. A contract can only be wrongly
granted as to size of the winning bidder if the government agency
determines that "further delay in awarding the contract would be
disadvantageous to the government."' 88 Regulations then provide
that "it shall be presumed that the protested bidder or offeror is a
small business concern."'18 4 If there were no governmental neces-
sity, then the size issue would be determined before the contract
179. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1974).
180. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 379
(4th Cir. 1974); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972), vacated,
488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973); Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
181. Farmland Indus. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 486 F.2d 315, 317 (8th
Cir. 1973).
182. Farmland Indus. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 681 (D.
Neb. 1972).
183. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.703 (2) (e) (1979).
184. Id. That presumption may be consistent with other purposes listed in 15 U.S.C.
§ 644 (1)- (2) (1976): to maintain or mobilize the nation's full productive capacity and to
protect the interests of war or national defense programs.
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was given and no damage would result.18 5 But the court would not
have found that awarding damages to Royal would be inconsistent
with a public purpose to preserve and expand full and free com-
petition to insure "the Nation's well-being and security," 10 and
the court would have denied recovery if it found, as the Comp-
troller General did, that "the administrative record ... [did] not
indicate that the certification made by Maintenance was lacking in
good faith."
187
IV. LITIGATION AS CONTEXT
I have suggested why courts need to respond to parties directly.
By doing so they help meet the need, for purposes of building
theory, to keep alive questions of what it means to fairly treat per-
sons and the communities to which they belong. The suggestion
that such a choice may contribute to the development of theory
requires faith that we can consciously work at changing society."'
The suggestion that recovery of damages makes a difference for the
injured party is a matter of fact rather than faith.
But the limitations that the context of litigation imposes on
185. The threat of damages to be granted while the contract was being performed
might subject the Air Force to the risk that Royal would refuse to continue work once
the size determination went against it, or fail to perform the work quickly and well. This
risk was confined to instances where the false certification was knowingly made and offset
by the apparent inability of the government to sanction the conduct by anything short of
criminal prosecution. The court of claims has held that the government cannot rescind a
validly awarded contract even if the bidder is later declared not to be a small business.
Allen M. Campbell Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Midwest Constr. Ltd.
v. United States, 387 F.2d 957 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The court in Savini Constr. Co. v. Crooks
Bros. Constr. Co., 540 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1974), found that "[tihe public interest
obviously requires that Congress first insure the contracts for governmental projects are
performed in a timely and competent manner."
In Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court like-
wise dismissed a claim because 15 US.C. § 645 "provides no civil remedy." In Raitport v.
Chase Manhattan Capital Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), plaintiff sought exten.
sive damages from various lending institutions, licensed by the Small Business Adminis.
tration as Small Business Investment Corporations, which had refused to finance his
business. The court relied on Royal Services for the proposition that "[n]either the Small
Business Act, nor the Small Business Investment Act create a private right of action in
favor of a frustrated borrower against a small business investment company." Id. at 1097.
186. Royal Serv. Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F-2d 86, 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
187. Id. at91.
188. A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 19 (1970), expresses
this view of progress though he would not have been likely to applaud the role suggested
here for the courts. "To the extent that progress is man-made, however, the discovery of
its proper direction is crucial, and that discovery would at some stage be seen to be quite
as much an act of faith as the optimistic reliance on automatic progress."
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the conclusion about consequences for parties need to be clear. No
social reform or scheme of compensation can be worked out of this.
The value is limited to those persons who accept the prospect of
an expensive, unfriendly, impersonal experience in court.'89 If
class actions were more readily allowed, or if attorneys' fees were
awarded to the winning party, then the numbers who could afford
to take advantage of my arguments might increase. But those
changes would only eliminate the financial barriers, and such
changes are unlikely to the extent the courts are themselves part of
the bureaucratic structure.190
These limitations indicate the importance of legislative action
to deal with the underlying problem, 9' but they do not suggest
that in the interim we ignore those plaintiffs who do bring their
claims to the courts. The lesson of this paper should apply to it-
the fact that judicial choice about damages from statute does not
seem directly to solve large problems for the public does not mean
that we should fail to deal with the question directly.
189. Felstiner, Influence of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 64 (1974) indicates factors which
reduce the utility of adjudicating interpersonnel disputes in government courts.
To the extent that such courts are staffed by specialists... the rules they apply
will tend to become specialized, importantly procedural and alien from everyday
norms. Specialized rules require litigants to hire professional counsel. Professional
counsel means added expense, inconvenience and mystification.
Id. at 82. The pro se plaintiffs have not fared well. Raitport v. Chase Manhattan Capital
Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
190. The position of judges may be part of "the basic architecture of the legal sys-
tem," which Galanter suggests "creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as
a means of redistributive (that is, systematically equalizing) change." Galanter, Why the
'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv.
95 (1974).
191. The uneasy thought has occurred to me that if legislators did consider the ques-
tion of individual redress they would often deny it-it would be an easy trade off, having
no coherent and vocal constituency. Still, I would hope that the reasons I have presented
why judges should provide individual redress would likewise persuade legislators. Spanogle,
The U3C-It May Look Pretty, But is it Enforceable, 29 OHio ST. L.J. 624 (1968) argues
that it is important that the legislation be clear about private enforcement:
There are tort theories which are developing to deal with such situations [as all-
night telephone calls by creditors, or a job in jeopardy]. But if the UC regulates
this conduct through administrative action only, the growth or even availability
of these doctrines may be limited. Thus the statute should either undertake to
provide an effective statutory cause of action to redress such unconscionable con-
duct, or should expressly disclaim any intention to limit the development of the
tort doctrines.
Id. at 663. This view prevailed and UCCC § 6.115 explicitly provides for private suit.
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